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ABSTRACT

The dissemination and synthesis of critical, but scattered, existing knowledge concerning the human costs of J.V. Stalin's once-acclaimed achievements are contained in this seed document. The document is primarily for teachers who are free to expand, contract, modify, or delete the seed suggestions provided according to the characteristics of their students and teaching situations. The package contains 10 representative activity modules about Stalin that may require anywhere from 1 to 4 class periods. The package's modules can be used in any order and as supplementary teaching materials that will enrich topics and exercise students' critical thinking skills. The first component of each activity module lists a number of critical and/or moral thinking issues for the teacher's pedagogical consideration. The package also contains 20 reference sheets that complement the activity modules and provide databases for the lines of inquiry suggested in the modules. The document concludes with an extensive bibliography. (BT)

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ED 429 008

The Trial of

J.V. STALIN

Exercises in Critical and Moral Reasoning

Paul F. Thomas

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J.V. STALIN

Exercises in Critical and Moral Reasoning

Paul F. Thomas

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PRELIMINARIES

SUGGESTIONS FOR USING THIS SEED DOCUMENT

Strategic Context, Purpose and Method

Tell me what you think of Stalin and I'll tell you what kind of a person you are.
Russian proverb

The aim of this seed document is not primarily that of adding to scholarly knowledge concerning *Stalin* and *Stalinism*. Rather its intent is to disseminate and synthesize some critical, but very scattered existing knowledge concerning the human costs of J.V. Stalin's once-acclaimed achievements. This material is targeted towards persons interested in the subject-matter, who were in all likelihood born after Stalin's death in 1953. Neither definitive treatment nor closure of discussion are possible here, given that fresh revelations of Stalin's crimes have been exponentiating since the breakup of the former Soviet Union in 1991. Moreover, the vast majority of former KGB, that is, secret-police, archives have yet to become accessible to researchers.

Saturated by an unremittingly, haphazard diet of *violence as entertainment*, dished out by popular information media that unabashedly and mindlessly oppose the would-be civilizing mission of the public schools, youth can not really be faulted for failing to understand the deep structures of world geography and history. How such structures come into being may still remain for them a mystery. *Individual violence* seems to entertain, whereas *massive violence* has become banal. *Violence as spectacle* can actually be traced back to the *bread-and-circus* policies cynically utilized by Julius Caesar to gain the willing support of the masses that initially elected him to power. If Julius Caesar may be regarded as the father of *violence as entertainment* on the mega scale, then by the same token, J.V. Stalin may arguably be history's greatest exemplar of the use of *mega-violence* and *terrorism* as *instruments of state policy*. Paradoxically, Caesar's violent grotesqueries continue to this day in modern simulated form, as part of an unofficial, educational curriculum promulgated by the television and movie industries. On the other hand, the actual mega-violence of contemporary history quickly becomes ***sanitized out of historical memory***, in both the unofficial curricula of the popular media, as well as in the official curricula of public education. It would seem that curricular treatment of the unpleasant facts of 20th century history has not been consistent with the waning "feeling-good" movement in public education. It would seem that the critical consideration of true but unpleasant facts may make inconvenient, intellectual

demands upon youth [or upon those persons who purport to speak for youth] that are not consistent with their "feeling good". For some *me-first* individuals, abetted by the soft-headed educators who have sanitized history into mythological pabulum, inconvenience or intellectual discomfort of any kind constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, that is somehow to be equated to the atrocities of Auschwitz. Such passivity that favours the trivialization of real human suffering to mere vicarious spectacle at best, renders the evils of the world banal, thereby ensuring their continuation.

Critical Pedagogy is diametrically opposed to such tendencies. And, as it happens, the elaborate, wilfully-constructed misinformation system that was part of the Stalin epoch of world history constitutes one of the best treasure troves of critical thinking fallacies ever to be conceived by the human mind. This treasure trove waits to be exploited by enterprising teachers not only for the *skills in critical analysis* that may be inculcated in pupils, but also for the recovery of *valuable substantive knowledge* that has hitherto been veiled—knowledge pertaining to the *deep structure* of pivotal world events that have exacted unprecedented costs in human lives. *The Trial of J.V. Stalin* thus attempts to move away from the trivial, sanitized, and naive, or "Dick and Jane" fare that colours much of our social-studies curricula, to deeper implicit questions concerning the *meaning* of individual and collective human life. If delinquency in its various forms represents the approach utilized by some young people in their quest for meaning, then does not the substitution of artificially contrived meanings by Hollywood, the television industry, and Madison Avenue do these people a profound disservice? What might be the effect of sharing the true history of the 20th century with them? . . . or the effect of letting them evaluate this history in their own terms, through participatory devices such as the *Trial of Stalin*? In other words, to understand is better than not to understand; but to act upon one's understanding is better still. It is only by willingness to act judiciously that one moves from the *cognitive domain* [that of "knowing about", i.e., *spectator knowledge*] to the *conative domain* [that of purposeful and ***meaningful*** striving and action]. The latter has the possibility of approaching *experiential knowledge* wherein true active empathy for the plight of others replaces *violence as entertainment* and *suffering as spectacle*.

The strategic method for inculcating the attitudes, skills, and critical knowledge already indicated, are implied by the strategic purpose. Given that *shadow-elements* underpin the general culture as indicated by the general public's fascination with the moral lapses of prominent personalities, one also needs to recognize (as the great psychiatrist, Carl G. Jung did) that although the shadow side of human life constitutes the largest factor in irrational human motivation, it can be and ***must be*** reclaimed for constructive purposes if human society is ever to be transformed for the better. Pedagogically, this means accepting students where they are and exploiting their fascination with courtroom trials and the love of judging everybody and everything other than themselves. A *trial* format not only provides a hook for capturing student

interest. It also creates a dialectical situation wherein students are required to critique one another's precious preconceptions, thereby enabling them to acquire more discernment, more self-knowledge and greater critical knowledge about the real world. Thus are acquired the skills in marshalling carefully scrutinized evidence to document the critical arguments that previous generations quite often failed to articulate. The gain in *self-knowledge* is not the least of the outcomes to be hoped for. To understand the forces that attempt to manipulate one is no mean feat. And to understand the *evil by proxy* that permitted Stalinism and its present residues to flourish is to understand, as did the late Walt Kelly, that

"We have seen the enemy and he is us."

Pedagogical Structure and Possible Dynamics

The present resource package is primarily targeted towards teachers who are free to expand, contract, modify or delete the seed suggestions provided, as they see fit, according to the characteristics of their students and the exigencies of their teaching situations. The package contains ***10*** representative, but by no means definitive or exhaustive, ***activity-modules*** which may require anywhere from 1 to 4 periods of class time for their realization. The order in which the modules are tackled is of no consequence; nor is it necessary that all the modules be attempted in any single school-year cycle. Although the modules are 'ecologically' linked, each one can also be handled on a stand-alone basis. Such flexibility is intended to recognize the scarcity of time-resources available to teachers who are responsible for covering mandated course-material. Although most teachers do not have the physical time to develop complementary or supplementary teaching materials that will either enrich topics or exercise students' ***critical thinking skills*** in areas of particular curricular interest, these same teachers are, at the same time, generally open to experimenting with, and testing, new supplementary fare that may come their way. Hopefully the present materials may be of some use in that regard. Even if a teacher has only time to deal with 2 to 3 modules in a given year, a different set can be dealt with in each yearly cycle. The modules can be approached in almost any order. Whichever ones are selected will unravel similar issues, but from different standpoints and using different data bases. This tactic is intended to exercise the faculty of critical comparison in reaching tenable inductive conclusions. Alternatively, if the class is divided into teams it might be possible by working on ***parallel tracks*** to have virtually all of the modules processed within a week, albeit not necessarily by the same individuals. The conduct of the actual courtroom trial—should the teacher decide to proceed with one—could then become an exercise in *cooperative learning*, with the various teams pooling their most valuable insights.

The modules are too telegraphic and pointed in style to be used directly by students without teacher facilitation in the first instance. Moreover, since a *discovery-learning strategy* is followed, it may not always be advisable for students to have access to partial answer keys (provided under the heading: *Sample Probes, Definitions, and Responses*). These keys are provided in consideration of the teacher's need for efficiency. However, the modules are also keyed to a series of some 20 *reference sheets* which provide databases for the lines of inquiry suggested in the activity modules. The appropriate sheets can be used in various ways. They can be: 1) given to the students as unmodified handouts to be read; 2) doled out as selected excerpts; 3) posted as part of a learning station; 4) handed over to the school librarian to be administered; 5) incorporated into an open-ended, computerized, hypertext database by a team of students as part of a project. The databases can be treated as self-contained with a junior class. With a more senior or enriched class, they may be treated as a starting point for further research, inquiry, and development. If a class has a high capacity for self-directed learning, then the creation of specialized task forces working on parallel tacks, as intimated earlier, could curtail the preparation time needed before a courtroom trial could take place. If the prior preparation is delegated as homework, then class time becomes prime time restricted to the docudrama of the trial itself.

The first component of each activity module lists a number of *critical* and/or *moral thinking issues* for the teacher's pedagogical consideration. Such toeholds for exploiting the material may be expanded or curtailed at will. Again it is better if a concept (or the need for it) is discovered by the students. Once students are grappling with an issue for which they have no precise vocabulary, the technical concepts can be adduced so as to best exploit the teachable moment. Reference Sheet #20, *An Overview of Critical Thinking Errors that Shape Our World*, summarizes a number of technical, critical thinking fallacies that might be useful at a number of junctures, according to the teacher's inclination. The sheet is—in the first instance—intended for the teacher's reference, as the vocabulary may be too difficult for direct presentation to some classes. At the same time, no attempt has been made to water down these technicalities for teachers, out of respect for their often unrecognized status as sophisticated overseers of complex thinking processes. Teachers wishing to proceed deductively from an analytical framework of their own devising, may wish to retranslate some of the critical-thinking concepts and dole them out in their own unique sequence. Other teachers may wish to use such concepts exclusively for debriefing court room participants as to the quality of their documentation and the cogency of their arguments. Another variant could entail having a panel of trial jurors (either appointed or elected) perform that debriefing. The most sophisticated variant would be to have selected *process-observers* from the classroom audience evaluate the performance of all possible participants, namely: prosecution, defence, judge, jury, and reporters, using a set of criteria developed from Reference Sheet #20. An additional touch might be the criterion of *going beyond the resource-package for obtaining evidence* to document a point.

Trial procedures . . .

Unless one is dealing with classes where *Law* is part of their curriculum, teachers would be wise not to begin their forays into the actual trial of J.V. Stalin with excessive consideration of procedural complexities. Such might be better handled on an ad hoc basis in response to pupil concerns. Otherwise, the trial risks becoming an exercise in sophistry, rather than a disciplined inquiry into objective historical facts and relationships. The trial is a *metaphor* with *History* personified as the client of the prosecuting attorneys. As such, the trial is also a *vehicle* for the pedagogical objectives already alluded to.

Students might be led to realize that *legal systems are human inventions*, at times having purposes that are not congruent with justice or the pursuit of truth. The simplest procedural format to adopt is that of a structured ***debate*** for and against certain propositions put forth by the "prosecution" and rejected by the "defence" respectively. A vote by the class as a whole can be taken before and after each battery of arguments is debated. The side that persuades the most people to switch their initial vote wins the argument on a given issue. Now, since it is sometimes possible to win an argument through sophistry rather than veracity of facts, it may be necessary to separate the two aspects when teachers or their student deputies evaluate the debating process. It can also be useful to videotape the debates, then replay the tape for designated critics, or show it to a different class for their critical commentary.

Advanced classes can be invited to develop a set of workable trial procedures with the assistance of the teacher. Such can be a synthesis adapted from various formats: *military law, criminal law, the Nuremberg trials, civil proceedings for damages, summary justice, natural justice,* and so forth. A question likely to emerge is: "Should Stalin be tried by North American legal standards . . . or by the standards with which he treated his subjects?" Strictly speaking, in Canadian law, a trial might not be possible because of: 1) the *Statute of Limitations* [the events not being within the lifetime of the present generation and, even if they were, issues of memory decay would be raised in court]; 2) the defendant, being deceased, could not be subpoenaed to appear in court to hear the charges.

Experience indicates that the most useful and flexible format is likely to be that of ***natural justice***, or proceedings in *equity*, especially in view of its attitude towards *evidence*. In American criminal law, a great deal hinges on the ***admissibility of evidence***. If a defence attorney can succeed in suppressing incriminating evidence, then a presumption arises that a crime was not committed—despite the existence of objective facts to the contrary. As a consequence, there is a popular belief afoot in North America that a crime is not really committed unless one is caught. And, as we know, much of the business of Stalinism had to do with the ***destruction of evidence and the concealment of crime***. The philosophical issues embedded in this type of situation merit

exploration by teachers and classes interested in pursuing its *moral dimensions*. Some possible focus questions might include:

1) Does objective truth exist (irrespective of perception)?
2) Can morality be *objective*? What would be its basis? Does it require a transcendent basis?
3) What are the *practical* implications of these questions? What is the relationship between law and morality? What should that relationship be?

Natural justice permits points to be raised by persons who are not parties to the proceedings, if such points are implied by the evidence and no one has raised them. *Natural justice* gives much weight to the *reasonable apprehension rule*. That is to say, if one has ***reasonable grounds*** for suspecting a crime or injustice, one is free to make one's points even if one does not have all the evidence in hand. Anecdotal evidence that is not cross-examinable in conventional courts then becomes admissible. As a matter of pedagogical protocol however, the teacher might provide the class with some starting data concerning Stalin's deeds, as part of a *preliminary hearing* or *examination for discovery* to determine whether a full trial was in order. By the very act of doing so, the class would be according Stalin a higher level of justice than he accorded to his subjects. Enterprising teachers will not hesitate to play the ***devil's advocate*** in order to sharpen the issues and the quality of documented argument. For example, ***who should carry the burden of proof***? Normally, whoever makes an allegation must provide the proof with the accused having the right to remain silent. However, under natural justice rules, an executive head of state can be presumed to have access to data not available to the average citizen. He can be required to show the source of his mandate. If such be ***illegitimate*** (as it was in Stalin's case) then to whose jurisdiction can he appeal? He will then have to show how he came by his power and that he did not abuse it. The trial then becomes an elucidation of particulars for the real education of contemporary society. Classroom time that would otherwise be spent upon procedural wrangling can then be more profitably devoted to an examination of the quality of the evidence. Such might perhaps entail ranking the quality of the various readings provided as well as other sources of information. Students might thereby gain some of the scholar's insight into the actual nature of history, how it is recorded and how it can be validated. Most importantly, they might realize ***the enormous practical significance of such questions*** in the first place, despite their initial academic aspect, especially since in dealing with J.V. Stalin, one is dealing with possibly the most powerful person in recorded human history. Despite the enormity of his crimes, he seems to have died a natural death and was mourned by many of his very victims (whose critical thinking faculties were undoubtedly impaired by both trauma and relentless propaganda). Clearly, ***precise and accurate thinking is the most practical of activities because such form the starting premises of everything else that we do***. Thus ***if our thinking is flawed, everything that flows from that thinking will be flawed***.

The simulated trial of Stalin also departs from an actual trial with respect to the possibility of a judicially imposed penalty or ***sentence***. If Stalin is dead, against whom can a sanction be exacted? It is necessary to take care that students are not tempted into trivial or flippant remarks, since no conceivable penalty could ever redress the wrongs committed under the Stalinist order. Real restitution is not possible. A principal objective of the simulated trial, however, is and should be *restitution of the historical record*. The prosecution should carefully work out precisely what it would like by way of ***symbolic damages*** and why it wants them. [For example, the claims may be symbolically made on behalf of an injured global civilization (or posterity, or descendants of Stalin's victims).] The prosecution can ask for *specific performance* (i.e., correction of the historical record) as part of its claim to damages. The class as a whole could discuss some of the ***mechanisms*** by which such might be realized [for example: letters to the press, letters to Moscow asking for release of KGB archives to Western scholars, and so forth].

Potential Audience for *The Trial of J.V. Stalin*

This present document may be of interest to individuals who work in any of the institutions, agencies or subject areas indicated in the text box overleaf. These persons may be classroom instructors, curriculum developers, adult educators, community activists or animateurs. The material may also be of direct interest to students or individuals involved in creative or dramatic writing.

Suggestions for Further Research and Application

This seed-document can be used in different ways. It might be regarded as a pilot that can be used in various ways by individuals of an experimental frame of mind. At a basic level, the document tries to seed existing curricula so as to increase knowledge and understanding of certain critical aspects of the Stalinist phase of 20th century history which, because of earlier Soviet propaganda coups, have escaped the judicious attention of the educational authorities. It also attempts to use such knowledge as a vehicle for honing critical thinking skills capable of distinguishing fact from misinformation. The inculcation of such skills lies at the heart of education's civilizing mission of preparing students for ***civic competence***. The ability to unravel real-world issues having incalculable practical consequences, empowers them to proactively participate in the creation of a better world. Enterprising teachers will, of course, devise further related activities and materials so as to improve what is, essentially, a starting resource-package.

Senior High Schools Grades 11 -12 *(Western Canada, Quebec, Maritimes)* Grades 11 - OAC *(Ontario)*	Civics *(USA)* History Geography Humanities Law Moral Education *(esp. E. Ontario, Quebec, Maritimes)* Social Science Social Studies World History *(USA)* World Problems
Junior Colleges **Community Colleges**	History Geography Social Sciences
Faculties of Education	Teacher trainees in high school subjects indicated above - subject methods - educational foundations - moral education - world problems Graduate courses in Curriculum Studies
Private, parochial and second-language schools	
Ministries of Education *(all provinces)* Selected state educational authorities *(USA)*	Attention: subject consultants, curriculum developers
Teacher Federations *(all provinces)* and selected cognate organizations (USA)	
Adult Education Associations both secular and parochial	Public interest groups concerned with violence, morality and public order

At more *advanced* levels, instructors and facilitators may wish to use this document as a springboard into activities that are essentially *research-focussed* so as to obtain further firm knowledge and to develop fresh lines of inquiry. Such activities may have applicational components by way of concept mapping, script-writing, role-playing, dramatization, creation of computerized data bases and games, and so forth. Even the creation of an expanded, annotated, resource bibliography could be very useful. Such could include recent films, videos, news broadcasts, Internet resources as well as books, journal articles and clipping files.

Institutions, agencies and individuals that accept the concept of *moral education* [a concept that can be divisive in certain educational circles] may wish to use this material and then move beyond it, in developing their own moral-education projects.

Other categories of criminal charges against J.V. Stalin . . .

This present document has tended to essentially focus on Stalin's physical atrocities against human beings, the rationale being that knowledge of such deeds requires ***universal dissemination*** as a pre-emptive measure against the possibility of their future recurrence. The ensuing losses to human civilization by way of cultural depredations have been equally stupendous, and would require a library of documents for their elaboration. Such depredations include: the wholesale destruction of great works of art and architecture such as churches, cultural monuments and entire urban and rural landscapes; depletion of natural resources; and poisoning of the natural environment through unregulated industrial pollution. Such destruction was not only of a material character. The *psychological* and *spiritual* havoc wreaked by Stalinism was equally profound, entailing as it did, the Russification of non-Russian peoples, the ruthless promulgation of state-sponsored atheism, perversion of history, literature and the mass media. Persons with specialist interest in any of the fore-mentioned aspects of culture, religion or ecology are accordingly urged to develop their own variants of *The Trial of Stalin*.

Feedback requested . . .

Given that the present *seed document* is a *trial balloon*, and not a definitive opus that purports to envisage all possible categories of issues or instructional activities, the author would welcome any constructive criticisms as to how its utility could be enhanced, and/or indications of the kinds of tactics and strategies that practitioners possessing their own specialized competencies, are finding useful for their unique situations. Such feedback may be sent to:

Dr. Paul. F. Thomas
Jointly Professor of Geography & Professor of Education
University of Victoria, Victoria, BC, Canada

MODULES

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MODULE 1: Stalin's Personal History and Character

Approximate Length: 1 lesson

Critical Thinking Issues

- Are the psychology and biography of leaders relevant to an evaluation of their deeds, or does their discussion invite the charge of *argumentum ad hominum* (personalistic attacks)?
- *Argumentum ad verecundiam* (appeal to authority).
- *Archetype of the hero*—idealization as moral fallacy, i.e., the historical hero can do no harm.
- Can socio-economic policy, in effect, institutionalize one person's psychopathology (as in the case of *Stalinism*)?

Moral Issue

- Is the concern with a single personality misplaced (*red herring)* since the voluntary compliance of others is also necessary? Is the system in which this can happen at fault as well as the dictators who are able to assume and maintain power by activating that system?

Resources Needed

Reference Sheet # 9
Cassette Recorder
Blackboard

[This space on each module to be used for teacher annotations.]

Methods/Activities/Applications

1. Have students:
   1) examine Reference Sheet #9 which gives a biographic and psychological profile of Stalin
   2) write what they consider the most important biographical and psychological details ①
   3) discuss
      i) how Stalin's background and characteristics ② might affect his rule,

ii) how they might feel being any one of the following:
- a relative
- a political colleague
- a servant
- a subject
- a non-violent rival
- an enemy

4) record responses on a cassette tape recorder to provide a contrast base for views that will be offered after consideration of more data regarding Stalin's deeds

5) for further research, have students compare Stalin to other national leaders, e.g. Napoleon, Hitler, Churchill, and Mulroney; after devising their own format for doing so

Sample Probes, Definitions, and Responses

Before considering the Stalin dossier, ask:
- who was Joseph Stalin?
- what do you know about him?
- what effect has he had on world history?

① **Figure 1-1 Table listing Stalin's traits**

Trait/Details	*Positive**	*Negative**
Mentality - very clever - patient	able to identify enemies and deal with them at opportune times	
Paranoid - suspicious - vengeful		liquidated some of the best minds in Communist Party

* *as perceived by the students with a class consensus—remember, that some traits can be used for both positive and negative categorization.*

② Was Stalin's stubbornness a positive or negative characteristic for a leader?
- he would not be easily fooled, or give into demands prematurely
- he would be too inflexible

MODULE 2: Overview of Stalin's Misdeeds

Approximate Length: 2 lessons

Critical Thinking Issues	Resources Needed
• *Personification*—can the sociopathology of Stalinism be attributed to a single person? • Is the concern with Stalin a form of *scapegoating* in order to occlude the role of complex multiple factors by reducing them to a single factor? **Moral Issue** • Does *raison d'etat* (interests of the state) justify crimes against humanity? • Can the state have a morality beyond itself?	Reference Sheet # 3 # 10 # 11 Film: *Stalin's Revolution* Blackboard

Methods/Activities/Applications

1. Students are to prepare for a trial of Joseph Stalin; this entails preparation of a list of charges against him as well as defences against the charges. The first phases involve listing all of the charges which will be amplified one-by-one in subsequent modules.
2. Introduce the film *Stalin's Revolution*. Have students write possible charges against Stalin as well as positive aspects of his rule.
3. Initiate a class discussion on Stalin's achievements and crimes; place responses on the blackboard. ①
4. Have students place consensus table from blackboard into their own trial folders.
5. For homework, distribute reference sheet #10, and have them scan it for possible charges.
6. Have students in small groups of four collectively reflect upon reference sheet #11, and modify their table of crimes and achievements.

7. List additional points raised by students on the blackboard.
8. Have students, for homework, restructure the table to group the various points made under suitable categories.
9. Using a student instructor, have the class decide on a final list of charges to be used against Stalin for trial purposes; place this revised list on the blackboard, or overhead, and into student's trial folder. ②

Sample Probes, Definitions, and Responses

Before considering the Stalin dossier, ask:

- who was Joseph Stalin?
- what do you know about him?
- what effect has he had on world history?

① **Figure 2-1 Table on Stalin's actions**

Crimes	*Achievements*
World War II would not have been possible without his support of Hitler in 1939	transformed a backward country having 97% illiteracy into a military and industrial superpower
responsible for 33 million peace time deaths in the Soviet Union	father of detailed economic planning in the industrial and agricultural spheres

② Make certain that the students refer to Reference Sheet #11 when preparing their final list of charges against Stalin.

MODULE 3: Crimes Against Humanity

Approximate Length: 1 lesson

Critical Thinking Issues	Resources Needed
• Are there boundaries to individual responsibility? • Who and what must share responsibility with Stalin? • What concatenation of circumstances, structures and consciousness: a) maximize; b) minimize opportunities for the emergence of Stalin-type phenomena. **Moral Issues** • The banality of evil. • Evil by proxy.	Reference Sheets # 7 # 10 # 12

Methods/Activities/Applications

1. Through class discussion explore the question of **crimes against humanity** ①, listing contemporary examples on the blackboard.

2. Using Reference Sheet #12, have students select passages that are consistent with the charge and then priorize the gravity of the acts. ②

3. For small group discussion:
   1) What purpose did the alleged atrocities serve from Stalin's viewpoint?
   2) What were the long-term effects of Stalin's use of violence on the Soviet nation? ③

4. Devise the case for the prosecution as well as for the defence. Place consensus summaries into students' trial folders.

Sample Probes, Definitions, and Responses

① A crime against humanity is an unwarranted, excessive act of cruelty, or violence perpetrated against innocent victims.

② A priorized list of crimes against humanity:

1) Ukrainian genocide-famine
2) Torture and conditions in the GULAGs
3) Wartime atrocities

③ Creation of a situation where a hierarchy of subordinates would fall over one another in their attempt to please their dictator to ensure their own personal survival. This had the effect of:

- multiplying atrocities
- inhibiting criticism and free speech
- permitting the growth of a state police apparatus to go unchecked (until the time of Khrushchev)
- creating a very secretive society that suppressed the sharing of information that is required for economic prosperity
- frustrating the development of human potential by denying individuals opportunities to grow through free and spontaneous participation in the political, economic, and social life of their society, thereby reducing the vigour and dynamism of that society

MODULE 4: Mass Murder/Purges

Approximate Length: 1 lesson

Critical Thinking Issues	Resources Needed
• *Argumentum ad populam* ("everybody is doing it") • *tu quoque* [you (and others) are doing it]. **Moral Issue** • Why should Stalin be singled out for having been more ruthlessly successful in getting his way than other powerful leaders practising *Realpolitik*—especially since he obtained for the Soviet Union a geopolitical status that rivalled that of Britain and the USA?	Reference Sheets # 1 # 13 Contents of students' trial folders from previous lesson Blackboard

Methods/Activities/Applications

1. Have students list various **mass murderers** throughout history; ① and speculate as to their deeds and the reasons for these actions. Individualized library research for 30 minutes and the pooling of information can result in a table as follows:

Figure 4-1 Table of Historical Mass Murderers ②

Historical Personality	*Misdeeds*	*Reasons*	
		Actual	*Professed*

2. Students to define **purge** ③; and to reflect upon Reference Sheet #1 to establish a charge of purging in the case against Stalin; make the counter-case by defending Stalin against these charges. ④

3. Discuss the table exemplified in Figure 4-1, agree upon the points of prosecution and defence, and place these into the students' trial folders.

Sample Probes, Definitions, and Responses

① What is a **mass murderer**?

- unlawful killing of large numbers of human beings by a single person or a group of persons.

② **Figure 4-1 Table of Historical Mass Murderers**

Historical Personality	*Misdeeds*	*Reasons*	
		Actual	*Professed*
Nero	burning of Rome	killed Christians for political reasons	attributed to Christians
Caligula		probably insane	
Genghis Khan		terrorist factor	
Hitler			
Truman	dropped atomic bomb on Hiroshima	to impress Soviets with American power	to end WWII
etc.			

③ A **purge** is to rid an organization (political party, army, etc.) of persons regarded as undesirable.

④ In North America, the CIA and the RCMP, and even various politicians, have been shown at times to use illegal acts for questionable purposes. Are we not as equally corrupt as Stalin? (This raises issues of scale and pervasiveness.)

- The problem in North America has been minuscule compared with the Soviet situation; also, we have not institutionalized such behaviour. It is recognized as deviant. Under Stalin, such behaviour was regarded as acceptable. To prevent it would have led to imprisonment and possible death—a consequence which does not prevail in North America.

MODULE 5: The Gulag System

Approximate Length: 1 lesson

Moral Issues	Resources Needed
• When, if ever, is *necessity* an acceptable defence for unconscionable measures? • Did Stalin's acts of "necessity" feed on each other to create an unending artificial necessity for a string of coverups?	Reference Sheets # 2 # 3 # 10 # 13 Blackboard

Methods/Activities/Applications

1. Have the students read Reference Sheets #2 and #3 dealing with war crimes and the GULAG system. ①
2. Divide the class: one half is to create a prosecution case for Stalin's GULAG system and the other half is to create a defence case.
3. a) Tabulate both prosecution and defence cases on the blackboard.
   b) Debrief and have students place information into trial folders. ②
4. Follow-up problem for student enrichment:
   - Discuss the pros and cons of a Stalinist style purge and labour camp system as an instrument of social policy. ③

Sample Probes, Definitions, and Responses

① What is a GULAG? What is the purpose of a prison?

- A GULAG is a place where people are kept in captivity for purposes of punishment (*Glavnoe Upravlenie Ispravitelno-Trudovikh Lheerei* - Main Administration of Corrective Labour Camps).
- A prison is a place where offenders of the law are kept away from society and punished in hope of rehabilitation. The GULAGs served another purpose—forced labour in the Soviet Union.

② **Figure 5-1 Table on GULAG System**

Points for Prosecution	*Points for Defence*
Stalin used the GULAG system to maintain personal power and control the Soviet population	Protected the honest citizens of the Soviet Union from enemies of the people
Excesses of violence, torture, and terror were commonplace in the GULAG	The unity of outlook obtained ensured maximum effectiveness against the enemies of the USSR who would exploit internal disaffection

③ Under what circumstances could such a system come into existence in North America?

Why does such a system not exist at present?

Is North America's present system of handling crime and anti-social violence the best one? Discuss.

What might a utopian system look like? Is such a utopia possible? Why or why not?

Figure 5-2 Table on Stalin's Purges and Labour Camps

Purges		*Gulags*	
Pros	*Cons*	*Pros*	*Cons*
permanent removal of undesirables	- excessively violent - elimination of great minds	provides a labour force	expensive to maintain

MODULE 6: Agricultural Catastrophe in Ukraine: Famine or Genocide

Approximate Length: 1 lesson

Critical Thinking Issues	Resources Needed
• *Semanticide*—the use of language as a weapon to label and destroy one's enemies, e.g. "kulaks", "enemy of the people" • *Nominalist fallacy* • *Legitimation* • *Utopian fallacy* • *Falsification* of the historical record (*revisionism*) • *Blaming the victim*	Reference Sheet # 4 # 13 Films: *Harvest of Despair* *Famine 33* Blackboard

Methods/Activities/Applications

1. Initiate topic of Ukrainian genocide-famine. What is a **famine**? ① How could a forced famine be created. List responses on blackboard.
2. Introduce film *Harvest of Despair* and have the students list the apparently positive and negative points to the famine, as disclosed by the film, as evidence for and against indicting Stalin on one of the mass murder charges.
3. Develop defence and prosecution cases regarding Stalin's role in the Ukrainian genocide-famine. ②
4. Have the students discuss:
   1) What possible benefits could such a genocide-famine have for the USSR? ③
   2) How was Stalin able to so effectively starve Ukraine? ④
   3) How successful was his policy? ⑤
   4) Why did Stalin suppress information regarding genocide aspects of his policy? ⑥

5. List the responses for 4(1) to (4) above on the blackboard in a table on the Ukrainian genocide-famine, with negative aspects and benefits for Stalin. ⑦

6. Develop a discussion on the New York Times reporter, Walter Duranty. Although he officially denied the famine in his public accounts, he disclosed the real situation to the British government —as did other observers such as Malcolm Muggeridge.
   1) Why the paradox in Duranty's reporting? ⑧
   2) Why didn't the West try to help Ukraine?

Sample Probes, Definitions, and Responses

① A famine is an extreme scarcity of food in a region.

A famine could be created by:

- destroying food
- seizing harvests and all edibles*
- cordoning off targeted areas to prevent escape*
- halt food shipments into the area*

② Was Stalin a mass murderer through his action during World War II? Yes/No, and discuss.

③ Stalin needed foreign exchange from the sale of Ukrainian grain to buy capital goods from abroad to build up Soviet industrial capacities. He may have believed that some peasants were hoarding grain to sabotage his industrial development efforts. The use of genocide also helped him control the Ukrainian population to ensure grain supplies for the long-term: for foreign trade purposes; to feed the cities; and to provide reserves in case of war.

④ Stalin utilized the methods marked * in ①.

⑤ Control was achieved. Cattle were destroyed by peasants anxious to escape being called *kulaks*, or rich peasants. As seed grain was confiscated, there was not enough to ensure large future harvests. It took many years before overall agricultural production was able to reach pre-World War I levels.

⑥ Stalin was hoping to obtain a treaty from F.D. Roosevelt whereby the United States would recognize the legitimacy of the Soviet government. (After the Revolution of 1917, the West had refused to officially recognize the U.S.S.R.) He knew he could not obtain such a treaty if the United States saw him for the tyrant that he was; but he also needed grain to buy American industrial goods. As soon as he obtained this treaty, the forced famine was lifted.

⑦ **Figure 6-1 Table on the Ukrainian Genocide-Famine**

Negative Aspects	*Benefits for Stalin*
- millions of innocent people were murdered - the genocide-famine was concealed from the rest of the world; historical truth was distorted	- Ukrainians regarded Germans as liberators from Stalin at the outset of war in 1941 - collectivized Ukraine to ensure future grain supply for all of USSR and trade - crushed nationalist operations in Ukraine keeping it within the Soviet orbit

⑧ 1) Duranty knew what Stalin wanted and possibly tried to give Roosevelt a favourable picture of the Ukrainian situation, so that Stalin could get his treaty and would lift the Ukrainian genocide-famine (as was the case). Thus, one could say that Duranty lied for "humanitarian reasons." The alternate hypothesis is that Stalin was in some way able to control or blackmail Duranty.

2) In the 1930s, anti-Soviet (and by extrapolation, anti-Slavic) feelings were so high in the West that the commonly held attitude in high circles regarding the Ukrainian genocide-famine was "if Slavs kill one another, then it will save us from doing the job." Some students might then argue that if Stalin was the perpetrator of genocide, a number of western elements could be regarded—by virtue of their wilful indifference—as co-conspirators.

MODULE 7: Military Unpreparedness

Approximate Length: 1 lesson

Critical Thinking Issues	Resources Needed
• Proliferation of disinformation via cascading cover-ups. **Moral Issue** • Negligence and unpreparedness as conscious military strategies without regard for unconscionable consequences.	Reference Sheets # 6 # 16 # 18 Blackboard

Methods/Activities/Applications

1. Divide the class into two groups: half of the class will develop a prosecution case and the other half, the defence case, using reference materials indicated. ①

2. As groups present findings to the class, a student recorder will list key points of consensus on the blackboard, which will then go into students' trial folders.

3. Key questions for class discussion:
   1) What is the underlying pattern, if any, that links allegations of misdeeds to points discussed, i.e., the Ukrainian genocide-famine, purges, destruction of Soviet "Maginot" line, and general military unpreparedness?
   2) Is there any indication that Stalin may have intentionally intended to weaken the Soviet's military power? Discuss. ②
   3) Read Nikolai Tolstoy's *Stalin's Secret War* and ascertain the reasons for Stalin's purges of the Red Army between 1934-38. ③

Sample Probes, Definitions, and Responses

① Was the Soviet Union adequately prepared to fight in World War II? Explain.

② Stalin considered the senior officers of the Red Army a threat to his personal power. He was more interested in eliminating his "rivals" than in weakening the army as his major objective.

③ Stalin regarded General Tukhachevsky, Chief of Staff of the Red Army, a personal threat and potential Bonapartist because he possessed all the qualities that Stalin himself did not, namely, a tall, powerful and handsome build; intelligence, magnetism, charm, and superb leadership ability. Tolstoy suggests that Stalin asked for Hitler's assistance in eliminating General Tukhachevsky. Hitler obliged by producing forged papers showing General Tukhachevsky as a Gestapo agent (Tolstoy, p. 229).

MODULE 8: Charge of Treason: Destruction of Soviet "Maginot" Line

Approximate Length: 1 lesson

Critical Thinking Issues	Resources Needed
• Historical revisionism	Reference Sheets # 5 # 15
Moral Issue	Blackboard
• Double dealing for reasons of *Realpolitik (i.e., to cover all bases)*	

Methods/Activities/Applications

1. Handout Reference Sheet #5 to students; have them study the sheet: note location of the Soviet "Maginot" line on the map. Explain possible reasons for its construction and destruction. ①

2. Are there any links between the destruction of the Soviet "Maginot" line and the natural attitudes between Ukraine and Stalin? ②

3. Summary of discussion and/or blackboard notes to go into students's trial folders.

Sample Probes, Definitions, and Responses

① Describe the Soviet "Maginot" line.* Where was it located in relation to Ukraine? What result might its destruction have on the defence of Ukraine?

* A line of command posts complete with artillery along Ukraine's western border. Its destruction left Ukraine open to invasion from Germany.

② See Reference Sheet #3, prosecution point #3.

MODULE 9: Criminal Negligence

Approximate Length: 1 lesson

Critical Thinking Issues	Resources Needed
• Problems of evidence and documentation • *Principle of degrees* **Moral Issue** • Was Stalin used as a scapegoat for disorders of politics and consciousness affecting a number of other nations as well?	Reference Sheets # 13 # 17 # 18 Blackboard

Methods/Activities/Applications

1. What is **negligence**? Students are to share perceptions of negligence. Are there degrees of negligence? Is there a scale of negligence? ①

2. For small group discussion:

   Reconsider the charges against Stalin that have been discussed in earlier modules and that have been implied in the reference sheets.

   1) Can any of these charges be restated as negligence?
   2) If so, which ones?
   3) Tabulate possible sub-categories of Stalin's "negligence" together with possible prosecution and defence positions. ②
   4) Enter consensus results into trial folder.

Sample Probes, Definitions, and Responses

① **Negligence** is a lack of proper care and/or attention. Is the death of one person just as tragic as the deaths of 100 people?

② **Figure 9-1 Table on Stalin's Negligence**

Charge	*Defence Position*	*Prosecution Position*
Purges	permanent removal of "enemies of the people"	transferred the Red Army into the hands of inexperienced military leaders
Incompetence	Stalin was assured of Nazi non-aggression	Soviet Union was unprepared for German invasion
Desertion	Stalin shunned public appearances	Stalin left Soviet Union without leadership during early stages of war

Comments

1. Did Stalin actually believe that Hitler would not attack, or did he deliberately leave the Soviet Union unprepared for an attack?
   1) Discuss both sides of this issue.
   2) What kind of evidence would be necessary to resolve the issue?
   3) Where might this evidence be obtained?

   Have students answer these questions as part of an enrichment assignment.

MODULE 10: Falsifying the Historical Record

Approximate Length: 1 lesson

Moral Issues	Resources Needed
• If *knowledge is power*, is the power of one person enhanced by denying knowledge to others? • *Falsification* as power-maintenance strategy. • When, if ever, do ends justify means?	Reference Sheets # 8 # 14 Blackboard

Methods/Activities/Applications

1. For class discussion, create a summary consensus on the following questions, and place on the blackboard; have students place information into trial folders.
   1) What aspects of Soviet life under Stalin lend themselves to cover-up? Why?
   2) Examine Reference Sheets #8 and #14, and speculate as to Stalin's motives for controlling and falsifying information. ①②
2. Was Stalin justified in his use of historical disinformation? Have students prepare defence and prosecution cases for Stalin after considering this question.
3. Have students examine Reference Sheet #8 and calculate the total number of domestic deaths that Stalin alone was responsible for. ③

Sample Probes, Definitions, and Responses

① Stalin's motives for falsifying information:

- to avoid personal blame
- as a terror tactic, to let his "enemies" unofficially know that any evidence or truth in their favour would be destroyed
- to project a good image to the rest of the world to support subversion abroad and to obtain concessions from "good-hearted" nations
- to avoid giving comfort to his enemies—both real and imaginary
- to ensure that only Stalin himself would know the most accurate information so as to better control his subjects, i.e., knowledge is power.

② Examination of Soviet fatalities under Stalin's rule:

1) How many of these deaths occurred during—peace time, war time?
2) How do the Soviet military losses during World War II compare to those of the other nations?
3) Could the Soviet losses during World War II have been much lower? Explain.

③ Total number of deaths during Stalin's reign may vary:

Total — 56 to 80 million*
Peace — 31 to 45 million
War — 25 to 35 million

* See Reference Sheet #8 for a complete statistical listing.

REFERENCE SHEETS

Reference Sheet Number		Page
1	Stalin's Purges	37
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Reference Sheet #1

Stalin's Purges

- Stalin's purges were designed to eliminate his real, potential, and suspected opposition and thus secure his power as leader of the Soviet Union.

- If Stalin was paranoid, as some historians have suggested, then the suspected opposition would have included the Soviet populace at large.

- "Stalin had more divisions massed against his own people than against the enemy during WWII," and "hundreds of thousands of well-equipped troops guarded the camps of GULAG in preference to stemming the onslaught of the Wehrmacht" (Tolstoy, p. xiv-xv).

- There were two major periods of purging under Stalin's rule: 1929-33, the beginnings of his purges when the "rank and file" (d'Encausse, p. 45) dissenters were either murdered or sent to prison camps and left to die; and 1934-38, which was "marked by a double advance, that of the terror and that of the state," here "ruling cadres and intelligentsia" were purged (d'Encausse, p. 27).

- ". . . Stalin was greedy for power and to establish his power, he eliminated first all of his adversaries, then seized by a mad lust, for blood he struck at the whole Soviet people" (d'Encausse, p. 27).

- No one was safe from these purges, not even close friends and relatives: "In those years (purge years) Stalin exterminated one after another, his own relatives and a number of comrades which had worked closely with him for many years. Alexei Svanidze (Stalin's brother-in-law, who was sent to a labour camp) never knew what he did" (Antonov, p. 116).

- There are varied estimates as to how many people Stalin had murdered during the purges:

  16.7 million - d'Encausse, *Order Through Terror*, p. 44

  19.0 million - Antonov, *The Time of Stalin*, p. 213

  20.0 million - Dyadkin, *Unnatural Deaths in the USSR*, p. 6

- Headed by Stalin's right-hand man Beria, the NKVD (*Narodny Kommissariat Vnutrennikh Del* - People's Commissariat For Internal Affairs) exercised its immense power by carrying out mass executions and migrations to prison camps during the purges:

> In the Ukraine a train was evacuating a party of some five hundred Slavs to the east. Suddenly the NKVD guards heard the sound of artillery fire further up the line. Suspecting they were cut-off, they halted the train, surrounded it, and ordered 'everybody out of the train'. A survivor recalled what followed. 'Our door was opened and we received the same orders. People began to step down onto the railroad bed. Suddenly at some signal the guards opened up with submachine guns and machine guns, which were mounted on the car platforms. The prisoners began to rush around. Some fell and were covered with blood. Some tried to hide under the wheels; others climbed back into the cars. The firing continued. When the shouts outside had subsided, the guards came to the doors of the cars and began to shoot inside. The walls were pierced with hundreds of bullet holes. Sometimes they eventually threw grenades through the open doors (Tolstoy, p. 244).

Reference Sheet #2

Stalin's Gulag System

- The GULAG system was used by Stalin as a network of forced labour camps to which he could send "enemies of the people".
- Stalin used his purges along with the GULAG system to ensure his power across the USSR.
- Those who "knew too much" were purged to ensure silence regarding the GULAG system (Antonov, p. 117).
- "By the beginning of the 1930s, the prison and concentration camp population was growing at such a speed that Stalin, perhaps influenced by the suggestion of a former prisoner serving in the NKVD, adopted the ideas of utilizing the prisoners as a major factor in the country's labour force" (Tolstoy, p. 10).
- "Treatment of the Soviet slaves was rendered more than habitually cruel because they were not regarded as merely a supply of cheap work, but also as enemies of the nation" (Tolstoy, p. 11).
- "The camp infirmary was so crowded with the sick, who lay on every cot and all the floors of the wards and the corridors, that any kind of care was impossible" (Tolstoy, p. 14).
- There were hundreds of GULAG camps in the Soviet Union, stretching from the Caspian Sea in the southwest to Vladivostok in the northeast, housing millions of prisoners.
- Death estimates from the Stalin GULAG system vary:

5 million	- Howarth, *Twentieth Century History*, p. 150
16 million	- Antonov, *The Time of Stalin*, p. 210
17 million	- Solzhenitsyn, *The Gulag Archipelago*, p. 17
25 million	- Tolstoy, *Stalin's Secret War*, p. 12

- "After 1923 a clear tendency to increase is evident for the number of prisoners. By 1927 their number had doubled. After only 10 years more, there would be 16 million. This figure should be set against the population of the country. According to the 1937 census, the Soviet population was 156 million. In 1938, figuring in the expected yearly increase, the population should have been over 158 million—that is almost 160 million. And so there were roughly 16 million prisoners out of a population of 160 million. Every tenth person" (Antonov, p. 210-211).

Reference Sheet #3

Military Crimes Against the Soviet People

Prosecution Case:

1. Stalin had more defences poised against the Soviet people during WWII than against the Nazi invaders (Tolstoy, p. 247-49).
2. Political dissidents were placed in penal battalions and sent to the military front, and if they attempted to retreat, they would be shot by Beria's secret police detachments to the rear (Tolstoy, p. 240).
3. Stalin's "Maginot" line from the Baltic to the Black Sea was ordered destroyed six weeks prior to the Nazi invasion to facilitate Nazi advance into Soviet territory. Stalin did not trust the loyalty of the Ukrainians whom he had ravaged in the 1930s and feared that the line could be turned against him should the Ukrainians, fighting for their own independence, control its Soviet side. He had indicated that, in the 1930s, he would have liked to have liquidated the entire Ukrainian nation, but that there were too many of them . . . In 1941, Stalin in fact delegated the further liquidation of the Ukrainians to the Nazis—so as to: (i) save himself the effort, and (ii) avoid any further personal blame for reduction of the Ukrainian population.

Defence Case:

1. Stalin did not trust the political loyalty of Ukrainians.
2. He needed the agricultural and industrial resources of Ukraine to solidify Soviet economic development and ensure a Soviet victory in the war. He regarded *war as an instrument of national policy.*

Counter to the Defence:

1. The Ukrainians were not voluntary subjects. Stalin had no right to demand their loyalty, just as he could not demand the loyalty of any other foreign nation, e.g., Argentina or Australia. The Ukrainians in pre-1939 Eastern Poland had never been under Russian hegemony in their entire previous history. They only became part of the Soviet Union as a result of the infamous Nazi-Soviet partition

of Poland in August/September 1939 which precipitated World War II. If it was this pro-Nazi stance of the Russians which led to that war, why did the Russians later attribute their own pro-Nazi attitudes to the Ukrainians?

Defence Rejoinder:

1. The Hetman of the Ukrainian Cossack State, Bohdan Khmelnytsky had signed a treaty of submission with the Russian Czar in 1654 (Treaty of Pereiaslav). Surely he spoke for all Ukrainians at that time.
2. "All's fair in love in war." "Possession is nine-tenths of the law." Does the United Kingdom restore wealth to Wales and Scotland? "To the victor belong the spoils has ever been a rule of history."

Prosecution Rejoinder:

1. The Treaty of Pereiaslav in 1654 was a mutual defence pact which the Muscovites later unilaterally revised to justify their perfidy.
2. If the Russians admit they are conquerors, why did they hypocritically adopt the rhetoric of peace and brotherly love to mask their rapacity?

Reference Sheet #4

The Ukrainian Genocide-Famine

This was a politically motivated, man-made genocide-famine in Ukraine 1932-33, devised entirely by Joseph Stalin.

I. Purpose

- force collectivization on the Soviet peasants—make grain collection easier for state representatives.
- control Ukrainian nationalism—"Ukraine was the largest and most powerful republic after Russia" (Carynnyk, p. 117). Stalin set out to paralyze and eliminate nationalist forces.
- Russification of Ukraine—accomplished through "de-Ukrainization—destroy spiritual and cultural backbone of entire nation as well as terrorize peasantry" (Kostiuk, p. 38).
- Stalin accomplished the above to ensure security of USSR from external threats.
- "Ukraine occupies a forward position in the Soviet Union in relation to capitalist imperialism . . . including intense interest of international imperialism, especially that of Germany in the area of Ukraine . . ." (Postyshev in Kostiuk, p. 68).

II. Death Estimates - 1932-33

(persons)	*(writer)*
6 million	Carynnyk
1 million	d'Encausse
7-8 million	Chamberlin, *Soviet Taboos*
5.5 million	Conquest
3 million	Duranty
7.5 million	Dmytryshn
5.8 million	Uralov
15 million	Palluch
10 million	Westwood
4 million	Chamberlin, *New York Times*
4 million	Stephen Duggan, *New York Times*

III. Details

- 1928-29—Stalin abandoned Lenin's New Economic policy (NEP) and replaced it with the *Soviet Offensive*—a crash program of rapid industrialization and forced collectivization.
- 1929-30—*Year of Great Turning Point*—compulsory collectivization and liquidation of *kulaks* (wealthier peasants), or any other peasant who the government wanted liquidated as part of Stalin's *"label and destroy"* strategy.
- changes were then forced at a faster rate in Ukraine:

Percentage of Peasants on Collective Farms

	1929	*1930*	*1932*
Ukraine	8.6	65	70
Russia	7.4	59	59.3

(Carynnyk, p. 70)

- Ukrainian peasants killed their livestock rather than give them to collective farms.
- 1930-32—"dekulakization"—deportation and, or liquidation of peasants who resisted collectivization—3.6 to 4.8 million "dekulakized" (Carynnyk, p. 77):

Actual Russian Grain Production (in tons)

1913	80,100,000
1930	83,540,000
1931*	69,480,000
1932*	69,870,000
1933	89,800,000

(Chamberlin, *Ordeal of the Russian Peasantry*, p. 502)

* the grain production was markedly down during these two years as a result of the collectivization program implemented by Stalin; this large decrease in production during 1931-32 meant that grain quotas in the future were impossible to reach, and Ukraine was forced to make up the losses adding to the impact of the famine.

- 1932—famine area was closed to foreign correspondents—officially no famine—close censorship of foreign press releases—USSR suppressed information of famine.
- November 1932—Moscow stopped payments to Ukraine for grain until all of (unattainable) grain quotas had been filled.
- Routes to cities were blockaded—no travel from countryside to cities—no trade or deliveries from cities.

- Government prevented aid from reaching famine victims (Dmytryshn, p. 202).
- The famine entered its worst stage during the winter of 1932—as a result, most of the deaths from the famine occurred in early 1933—just after the winter.
- The peasants' private grain stores were confiscated to meet Soviet grain quotas.
- 112,000 party members were sent from Russia to ensure delivery of all Ukrainian grain.
- Individual (non-collectivized) farmers were the hardest hit—25% died as compared to 10% of collectivized farmers (Chamberlin, *Russia's Iron Age*, p. 87).
- Leading figures in Ukraine's economic, cultural, and political life were arrested and executed.
- Stalin undertook a purge of the Ukrainian Communist Party—27,500—23% of the party—not only expelled from party, but arrested and liquidated (Kostiuk, p. 16).
- Moscow sent settlers to Ukraine region immediately after the famine ended in 1933—"Even more Russian colonists were brought into the cities, thus doubling the number of Russians in Ukraine from 5.6% of the population to 9.2% in 1939" (Carynnyk, p. 103). Stalin's main objective was the Russification of Ukraine.
- Purges of the Ukrainian intelligentsia continued until the Nazi invasion of 1942 (from film, *Harvest of Despair*).
- Livestock declined in numbers during the famine as many Ukrainian farmers killed their animals rather than have them horded on to the collective:

	1929	*1933*
Horses	5,543,000	2,772,000
Cattle	7,611,000	3,832,000
Cows	3,873,000	2,049,000
Pigs	3,472,000	1,390,000
Sheep	6,652,000	1,543,000

(Chamberlin, *Ordeal of the Russian Peasantry*, p. 495)

- "The purges after 1933 were an attempt to cover-up the genocide aspects of the Ukrainian famine" (Hosking, p. 184).
- Stalin needed silence about the Ukrainian genocide-famine to be successful in his international endeavors, especially with economic dealings with the United States.

Reference Sheet #5

Stalin's Destruction of the Soviet "Maginot" Line

- During the 1930s, a line of fortifications was constructed along the Soviet Union's western border, between the Baltic and Black seas.
- The line was composed of reinforced concrete command posts, observation posts, caponiers, and semi-caponiers, each containing 2 to 4 embrasures for artillery and other armaments (Grigorenko, p. 47).
- The tens of thousands of permanent fortifications were linked by underground tunnels, were hermetically sealed case of gas attack, and were powered by their own generators (Grigorenko, pp. 46-47).
- The 1,200 kilometre line cost approximately 120 billion rubles to build (Grigorenko, p. 47).
- Between 1939 and 1941, the western border of the Soviet Union was moved westward with the annexation of the Baltic Republic, Western Byelorussia, Western Ukraine, Bessarabia, and northern Bukovia.
- In spring 1941, with world war imminent, the fortifications along the old border were **completely destroyed before** the fortifications on the new western border were completed.
- Instead of having the old fortifications as a second line of defence, the western border of the Soviet Union was virtually defenceless.
- When the Nazis attacked in June 1941, they advanced through the western regions virtually unimpeded.
- Stalin claimed in his later accounts of World War II that he had signed the 1939 accord with Hitler in order to give him time to strengthen the Soviet defences; this claim is not consistent with the destruction of the Soviet "Maginot" line and is a prima facie indicator of historical *revisionism* and *disinformation*.
- See also Reference Sheet #3.

Reference Sheet #6

Soviet War Preparedness

Prosecution Case:

1. The success of the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, leads to the question of Soviet preparedness for war.
2. There was no harmonious or fully elaborated modern military strategy because most of the General staff had been executed.
3. There were low levels of training at all ranks.
4. Stalin's forces were in the middle of reorganization on the eve of the war.
5. The purges of the 1930s took away most of the experienced military leaders in the Soviet Union.
6. There was a lack of weapons and ammunition in key sectors of the Soviet Union prior to WWII (Petrov, p. 130).
7. Poor airfield locations led to most of the Red Army's planes being destroyed on the ground in the first months of the war.
8. The Red Army suffered from weak anti-aircraft and anti-tank defences because Stalin stopped production of these weapons during the early stages of the war.
9. Stalin had several advance warnings of a possible German attack (Tolstoy, p. 215).

Defence Case:

1. By this time in Stalin's reign, Soviet industry was strong and diversified, agriculture was mechanized, class distinctions eliminated and the socialist structure was firmly established—"Russia was an invincible monolith" (Grigorenko, p. 25).

2. The Red Army was the most advanced in the world—superior to the Germans in numbers of tanks, planes, artillery, and mortars—superior quality of tanks:

	USSR	*Germany*	*Ratio*
Divisions	170	190	1:1.1
Tanks	15,000	3,712	4:1
Military Planes	9,000	3,500	2.6:1

(Grigorenko, p. 26)

3. Russia had enough strength not only to hold the enemy back, but to defeat him completely in the first year of the war (Grigorenko, p. 27).

4. Stalin had many reasons to believe that Hitler would not attack the Soviet Union, at least not immediately:
   a) Nazi-Soviet Non-aggression pact of 1939;
   b) "Stalin hoped—no, he was certain—that Hitler would attack his western neighbours. A war might weaken Britain and France. And Germany at the same time" (Antonov, p. 259); and
   c) After signing the *Friendship and Frontier Treaty*, Stalin told Ribbentrop (German Ambassador to the Soviet Union) "that the Soviet government took the new pact most seriously; he could personally guarantee on his word of honor, that the Soviet Union would not betray its partner" (Antonov, p. 261).

Counter to the Defence:

1. Stalin indicated in an address to a military academy in Leningrad, six weeks prior to war, that he expected a German attack in June 1941.

Reference Sheet #7

Allegations of Atrocities Committed by J.V. Stalin

- During his reign as dictator of the Soviet Union, Stalin committed crimes hitherto unprecedented against humanity, surpassing Hitler by a factor of three.
- Perhaps Stalin's worst and least publicized crime was the genocide-famine imposed on the Ukrainian people during 1932-33, which was "both caused and compounded by the policies of the Soviet government, or more specifically, those of Stalin . . ." (Dolot, p. vii).
- Through the Ukrainian genocide-famine, Stalin succeeded in murdering millions of innocent citizens in Ukraine, "whose only crime was resisting shackles and chains" (from film, *Harvest of Despair*, NFB).
- Death estimates of the Ukrainian famine vary:
  - 22 million, Antonov, *The Time of Stalin*, p. 213
  - 10 million, Conquest, *The Great Terror*, p. 23
  - 10 million, National Film Board, *Harvest of Despair*
- Stalin was also responsible for the purging of innocent Soviet citizens and government officials:
  - 16.7 million, d'Encausse (*Order Through Terror*, p. 44)
- Stalin had Soviet and foreign prisoners brutally tortured and murdered in his prison camps with incredible efficiency and ruthlessness.
- "A former prisoner, who with his comrades conducted a rough-and-ready estimate, reckoned that 7 million GULAG inmates were slaughtered in the first year of the war" (Tolstoy, p. 283).
- Stalin destroyed his own defences on this western frontier (Soviet "Maginot" line) six weeks before Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union, thus allowing German armies to ravage Ukraine, essentially without opposition.

- Stalin encouraged his Red Army to inflict murder, rape, beatings and terror on civilians of invaded countries:

  > When a Yugoslav partisan leader took an opportunity of complaining about this (Red Army soldiers raping and murdering in Yugoslavia) to Stalin himself, the jovial leader explained that the Red Army, which after all included a large number of criminals, had earned its pleasures. He then recounted an incident in which he extended his protection to a major who had raped a woman and murdered a fellow officer who remonstrated with him (Tolstoy, p. 267).

- Stalin's technique was to "label and destroy," i.e., to designate individuals or groups that stood, or seemed to stand, in the way of his objectives, or whom he simply did not like, as "enemies of the people," "saboteurs," "class enemies," "kulaks," "imperialist spies," and so forth.

Reference Sheet #8

Death Estimates in the Soviet Union 1914-1945

Event	*Estimated Number of Deaths*	*Bibliographic Reference*
World War I	1,700,000	Langer, *Encyclopedia of World History*, p. 976
Revolution	3,100,000	Dyadkin, *Unnatural Deaths in the USSR*, p. 15-16
Civil War	295,000	d'Encausse, *Order Through Terror*, p. 44
	500,000	Hosking, *A History of the Soviet Union*, p. 74
Collectivization	10,000,000	Conquest, *The Great Terror*, p. 23
	22,000,000	Antonov, *The Time of Stalin*, p. 213
Purges	16,700,000	d'Encausse, *Order Through Terror*, p. 44
	19,000,000	Antonov, *The Time of Stalin*, p. 213
	20,000,000	Dyadkin, *Unnatural Deaths in the USSR*, p. 15-16
GULAGs	5,000,000	Howarth, *Twentieth Century History*, p. 209
	16,000,000	Antonov, *The Time of Stalin*, p. 279
	17,000,000	Solzhenitsyn, *The Gulag Archipelago*, p. 17
	25,000,000	Tolstoy, *Stalin's Secret War*, p. 12
World War II	20,000,000	Howarth, *Twentieth Century History*, p. 209
	27,500,000	Antonov, *The Time of Stalin*, p. 279

КОНФИДЕНЦИАЛЬНОЙ

РЕЕСТР
И.В. СТАЛИН

00211279

ОХРАНА ГЕОЛОБАКУВОЙ

Reference Sheet #9

Stalin Dossier

The following information is a biographical and psychological profile of defendant 00211279, J.V. Stalin.

Name	Joseph Vissarionovich Djugashvili
Aliases	Koba, Sos, Ko, K. St, K. Kato, Koba-Stalin, Gaioz Nizharadze, K. Salin, K. Solin, Stalin
Born	December 21, 1879
Place of Birth	Dido-Lilo, province of Georgia
Height	5 feet and 4 inches
Weight	160 pounds
Parents	Father: Vissarion Djugashvili, shoemaker Mother: Ekaterina Geladze, working woman
Physical Description	ordinary man of average height and build; dark complexion, pock-marked face, black, rotten teeth, mouth smells of decay, heavy moustache, eyebrows and brow; left arm three inches shorter than the right, no control of this left hand, and usually wears a brace on left arm; thick Georgian accent
Education	Summer 1890-94—church school at Gori September 1894-May 1899—Tiflis Theological Seminary good student; won scholarship to attend at Tiflis; tendency to rebel against authority; expelled May 1899, reasons unknown

Criminal Record

numerous arrests for political agitation and related offences

Date	*Location*	*Result*
April 1902	Batum	exiled - escaped
March 1908	Baku	exiled - escaped
March 1910	Baku	exiled - escaped
September 1911	St. Petersburg	exiled - escaped
April 1912	St. Petersburg	exiled - escaped
February 1913	St. Petersburg	exiled - conscripted 1916

Record in Communist Party

February 1912	Stalin serves on first Central Committee Bolshevik Party
March 1917	Returned to Petrograd and played role in Revolution
1917 - 1923	Commisar of Nationalities
1918 - 1920	Politico military leader during Civil War
1919 - 1923	Commisar of State Control
1922 - 1953	Secretary General of Party's Central Committee Member of Politburo and other committees

Personal Characteristics

I Psychological Make-up

- Someone who is constantly faced with anger, violence, poverty, viciousness, etc., is probably going to adopt qualities similar to those of Stalin.
- His growth was somewhat physically retarded in his early years due to infections, accidents, etc.
- There is a historical conflict over whether Stalin went to or finished school; most sources mention that Stalin did attend school and did very well until he entered a Georgian Seminary; nonetheless, school was not a pleasant experience for Stalin.
- Stalin really never knew any other life than the constant chaos and violence that surrounded him: "all facets of society were lies, especially the Church and school" (Antonov, p. 234; Carlson, p. 498).

- "The root of Stalin's inexhaustible cynicism is sought to be here . . . in his formative years where all parts of society seemed to treat him cruelly" so he turned his back on society and became anti-social (Antonov, p. 234; Carlson, pp. 496-7).
- "Stalin's extreme dependence on flattery suggests a need for constant affirmation of his self-ideal, and his vindictiveness toward those who threatened or slighted him hints at the fragility of his entire psychic structure" (Antonov, p. 234; Carlson pp. 496, 498, 493).
- Stalin, as a youth, was dominated by his mother's devotion; Freud said that "a man who has been the indisputable favourite of his mother keeps for life the feeling of a conqueror, that confidence of success that often induces real success" (Tucker, p. 76; Carlson, pp. 537-40).
- Stalin's relationship with his adoring mother meant that "he developed a confidence in his skills and that feeling of being a conqueror which is so often the product of intense maternal devotion" (Glad, p. 324; Davison, pp. 348, 352; Carlson pp. 533, 540).
- Stalin created an idealized self-image that required him to seek not only political power, but also recognition of himself as a great intellectual and social leader (Carlson, p. 493).
- ". . . Stalin created an idealized image of himself as a defence against secret fears of being unworthy" (Glad, p. 323).
- ". . . His claims for superiority were so extreme that he could never really believe them himself" (Antonov, p. 234; Carlson pp. 493, 498, 533-40).
- Stalin tried to identify with the poor, downtrodden, etc., and directed his hatred against legitimate authority.
- These characteristics were fused in Stalin's identification with Koba; he was supposed to be "strong, silent, cunning, vengeful, and seeking for justice for the people" (Antonov, p. 324).
- In general, Stalin was always attempting to attain power, but in a way that did not benefit society; he was constantly faced with oppression and violence and thus he became a hardened person even to his own family; he had a warped sense of reality and made decisions on how to best maximize his power.
- Stalin had a *photographic memory*. This made him a very effective spy prior to the Revolution, as it was unnecessary for him to keep written notes. At a party in Moscow during a bright spot in the war against Germany, he startled a British consular officer with his ability to recite many verses of Goethe's *Faust* in

German, and from memory, after this same official had read a representative line of that work from a small book he was carrying in his pocket (Svandize). This memory gave Stalin a tremendous administrative throughput enabling him to create and manipulate an enormously powerful bureaucratic apparatus which his less able successors were unable to control—hence one reason for the eventual but belated demise of the USSR in 1991.

- It has been suggested (by Rancour-Laferriere, p. 97) that Stalin was a *homosexual* by virtue of an unusual affection expressed towards his bodyguard, K.V. Pauker in the mid 1930s. Allegedly, it was a homosexual feeling for Adolph Hitler that accounted for Stalin's reluctance to confront Hitler's invading forces in late June, 1941. His savage persecution of known homosexuals may have been a case of: "My lady doth protest too much."

II Temperament

- Stalin had a fierce temper, but "had a long memory and exceptional patience" (Uralov, p. 79).
- Stalin could wait for years, remember, and then seek harsh, merciless revenge on those who crossed him: "Lenin died before he could deal with Stalin, and Trotsky the friend of the Georgian Nationalists was no longer there to defend them from Stalin's wrath. Stalin waited ten years, then sent Beria who liquidated all the Georgian Bolsheviks whom he had formerly accused of nationalist tendencies" (Uralov, p. 79).
- There is a general consensus among historians that Stalin had a strong, often violent temper, but he was able to hold it back and then release it when it was beneficial for him to do so.
- Much of Stalin's violent temper stems from his childhood where violence and poverty dominated: "an individual's character is formed, of course, in early childhood, in the first years of life. What did little Stalin experience in his family, in his preschool years, and at school? Beatings, cruelty, rudeness, and constant humiliation" (Antonov, p. 232).
- His father, and even mother, beat him unmercifully for no apparent reasons; "most of all Stalin hated his father, but gradually this hatred expanded until it included all fathers, all other men" (Payne, *The Rise and Fall of Stalin*, p. 34). Perhaps this statement by Payne best explains why Stalin so ruthlessly purged Soviet society.
- Tucker expanded on this by suggesting that "the alien force that his father represented had somehow been internalized within him" (Tucker, p. 75).

- Stalin became hardened and indifferent to cruelty; he was determined not to surrender and became very cynical towards those around him.
- However, Khrushchev differed somewhat from most historians in his picture of Stalin; he thought Stalin was ruthless, but at times, he could be "patient and sympathetic"—a great political skill to possess (Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers*, p. 55).
- Stalin's reversions to sympathy seem to have been more for his self-image than for the general good.
- "The Stalinist system was able to develop because Stalin was greedy for power and to establish his power, he eliminated first all of this adversaries, then seized by a mad lust for blood he struck at the whole Soviet people" (d'Encausse, *Stalin: Order Through Terror*, p. 27).

III Courage

- In general, Stalin seems to have had two lives in terms of his courage: while he was young, a revolutionary, Stalin was involved in some street fighting and other daring acts; but as he grew older, Stalin became quite petrified, almost in a constant state of fear, verging on paranoia.
- Deutscher claimed that Stalin never, or rarely engaged in violent conflict himself; as Koba he "acted as sort of a liaison officer between the Caucasian Bolshevik Bureau and the fighting squads. In this capacity he was never directly engaged in the raids . . . his technique of dissimulation was so perfect that this role of his was never detected by the eyes of the Party" (Deutscher, *Stalin: A Political Biography*, pp. 87-88).
- Some historians agree that Stalin's seemingly bravado acts during WWII were really fronts designed to hide his true cowardly nature.
- Khrushchev remembered Stalin saying "this is the end [Germany's invasion of the USSR] . . . everything that Lenin created has been lost forever" (Antonvov, p. 243).
- Khrushchev was surprised by what he saw of Stalin at the beginning of the war: "in a word, Stalin trembled with fear" (Brumberg, *Russia Under Khrushchev*, p. 11).
- The view that Stalin had a psychological collapse during the early days of the Nazi invasion of the USSR are contradicted by the post-glasnost publication of the Kremlin logbook kept by his receptionist. This log shows that he received an intense stream of visitors who had to sign in, on June 21 and June 22, 1941 (Sudoplatov, p. 433). [However this log can also be a revisionist forgery.]

- During the war, Stalin surrounded himself with the best weaponry in Moscow and was rarely seen.
- The general consensus of Stalin during the war was that he showed little physical courage and he panicked in times of danger.
- However his nephew, Svanidze, reports that for relaxation Stalin was fond of hunting wild boar whilst armed only with a spear. [Presumably the bodyguards who followed him were armed with rifles.]

IV Stamina

- Stalin seemed to have great stamina; during the war years, Stalin delegated very little authority to others; once Russian armies began to effectively slow the German advance, Stalin gained confidence and became more involved in the war effort, until he was making all of the decisions. He was 61 years of age when the war broke out and thereafter virtually worked (with infrequent respites) for 16 to 18 hours a day, 7 days a week for the duration of the war.
- During this period, he slept very little with no apparent loss of wits; possibly his long periods of exile in Siberia helped him to develop a great stamina; also as a child, he had to rely on himself most of the time, developing independence (loner) and stamina.
- "Many allied visitors who called at the Kremlin during the war were astonished to see on how many issues, great and small, military, political, or diplomatic, Stalin personally took the final decision . . . thus he went on, day after day, throughout the four years of hostilities—a prodigy of patience, tenacity, and vigilance, almost omnipresent" (Deutscher, p. 467).
- Stalin felt that the strength of will was all important: "I believe in only one thing the power of the human will" (Medvedev, *Let History Judge*, p. 324).
- Stalin had an incurable lust for power and to attain this he developed a super-human strength of will: "I am a gradualist" (Medvedev, p. 324).
- Stalin's great stamina and strong will allowed him to become the almighty despot that he was.

V Paranoia

- Most historians today believe that Stalin was suffering from paranoia, but Antonov disagrees: he states "this would be attributing all of his crimes, which

cost millions of lives, to mental illness; would a mentally unbalanced person have been able to hamstring all his political rivals and build such a model apparatus of power? No, Stalin was unquestionably of sound mind. . . Neither schizophrenia nor paranoia has any hold over such malicious natures. But his boundless ambition might seem maniacal to an outsider" (Antonov, p. 254).

- Yet Robert Tucker feels that Stalin, if not a paranoid man, was at least a psychopath, who had fears about his intellectual shortcomings and strong dependence on others—as evidenced in his extreme need for flattery and his fear of being alone (also noted by Khrushchev).

- Stalin felt that all his public support was self-orchestrated and not real affection, so he was extremely defensive towards all others—worrying about plots, assassinations, etc.

- He felt that even those closest to him disliked his actions and presence (which was actually the case).

- Stalin's reaction to this hatred was to use violence as a psychopath would: "Defence was his exclusive concern and he guarded it fiercely. If anyone else expressed the slightest interest or curiosity about this or that new weapon, Stalin immediately became jealous and suspicious" (Brumberg, p. 11).

- Stalin was aware that the party was unpopular and he himself unpopular as party leader; because of this, "thousands of men were employed to protect him; he was very cautious, he used decoy cars and had guards at every portion of his daily route" (Payne, p. 385).

- Stalin always feared assassination plots and he never walked the streets of Moscow—be it alone or with guards.

- "Stalin feared private meetings between any of his colleagues, and immediately put them under suspicion; he always carried a revolver around in his coat pocket. He may have felt inferior as political leader since he often dealt with very able persons. He took control of his protection, looking over maps, tracings, etc., and then executed these ways of avoiding bullets" (Payne, p. 385).

- Stalin may have been paranoid and even a psychopath, but not necessarily suffering from any major mental illness; Stalin may have committed atrocious crimes, but they were done by someone who carefully calculated his chances for survival and power, and then executed these plans.

VI Georgian Tradition

- In true Georgian tradition men were dominant in the family, women not treated very well, and children encouraged to follow in the footsteps of their fathers; also, men were fiercely proud and quite willing to fight for their own or family's honour.
- These descriptions of Georgian males accurately cover much of Stalin's personality; as much as Stalin denied his Georgian heritage and customs, he was undeniably from this region of the Soviet Union.
- In his youth, Stalin assumed a Georgian trait of telling anecdotes and even became somewhat of a prankster and joker (albeit very crude); he also had the Georgian traits of stubbornness and revenge.
- He would be caught conversing in Georgian, even though he knew this was not permitted at his Imperialist school, hence he would be beaten by his teachers (Antonov, p. 234).
- Yet Stalin wanted to disassociate himself from his Georgian heritage. "With his association in the greater Russian Party (through Lenin) he would be freed from his earlier identification with a weak, Georgian tradition" (Glad, p. 325).
- As Koba, Stalin began to disassociate himself with the Georgians: "Stalin's cold and arrogant personality caused his fellow revolutionaries in Georgia to dislike him (as Koba he was quite un-Georgian); one fellow Georgian revolutionary recalled "he just cannot take a joke anymore . . . strange Georgian doesn't understand jokes . . . he replies with fists to the most innocent . . ." (Glad, p. 325).
- The Georgians felt that the Russian people did not understand them; general impressions of the Georgians were that they were trusting, impressionable, quick-tempered, and devoid of energy and initiative.
- In general, Stalin was from the Georgian tradition, but tried to disassociate himself from his roots to be accepted on the national scene of Russian politics.

Reference Sheet #10

Overview of Stalin's Misdeeds

J.V. Stalin is hereby charged with the following crimes:

I **Mass Murder**

- **Purges**—Stalin murdered approximately 16.7 million people (d'Encausse, p. 44) during his purges of the Red Army, Soviet bureaucracy and citizenry, in his attempt to rid the Soviet Union of non-communist, or counter-revolutionary elements.
- **World War II**—During World War II, Stalin ordered the deaths of internal enemies "comparable to those sustained at the same time by the Red Army" (Tolstoy, p. 251).
- **GULAGs**—Stalin's GULAG Archipelago was a system of murderous prison camps where so-called "enemies of the people" were sent to perform hard labour and eventually die; these prisons worked extremely efficiently in conjunction with the purges to suppress political dissents both real and merely suspected.
- **Ukrainian Genocide-Famine**—by subjugating the population into starvation between 1932-34, Stalin effectively forced the Ukrainians into accepting collectivization and Soviet domination; 10 million perished (Conquest, p. 23).

II **Treason**

- **Destruction of the Soviet Maginot Line**—In the 1930s, at a cost of 120 billion rubles, Stalin created a line of defence from the Baltic to the Black Sea to protect the Soviet Union against a possible German invasion; six weeks before *Operation Barbarossa* (Nazi invasion of Russia on June 22, 1941), Stalin destroyed this line knowing Hitler would attack, thus leaving the Soviet Union open to attack (see also Reference Sheets #3 and #15).
- **Collaboration with the enemy**—Stalin collaborated with archenemy Adolf Hitler in the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939, making it possible for Hitler to launch World War II (Kolasky, 1990).

III Negligence

- **Military Unpreparedness**—Stalin did not militarily prepare the Soviet Union for an invasion which he knew was imminent; his country was left open to an attack from Germany (Reference Sheets #3 and #15).
- **Decimating the Red Army prior to the Outbreak of War**—Stalin purged his military forces, and almost all of the senior officers before the war with Germany, leaving the Soviet Union in inexperienced and incapable military hands; this contributed to the death of millions of Soviet military personnel during the first weeks of the Nazi invasion.
- **Incompetence**—Stalin developed a dictatorship in the Soviet Union where almost all decisions in government were his; thus, all of the mistakes, set-backs, etc., were the result of Stalin's incompetence—as well as his appointments in the government and their resulting blunders.
- **Desertion**—During the initial stages of the war with Germany in June 1941, Stalin became panic-stricken and hid in his Moscow apartment refusing to see anyone or make decisions. He left the Soviet Union without any leadership during the most critical juncture in its history. This desertion was compounded by not letting anyone else make important decisions, under his dictatorship.

IV Other Crimes Against Humanity

- During his rule of the Soviet Union, Joseph Stalin committed many brutal crimes against humanity: purging of innocent people; placing opponents in prison; torturing and mutilating prisoners (military and political); committing physical and cultural genocide against the Ukrainians; permitting the raping of women; and ordering/allowing the peace-time deaths of 33 million Soviet citizens.

V Falsification of Historical Records (Disinformation)

- Throughout the course of his dictatorship of the USSR, Stalin consistently concealed and/or falsified historical events for the advancement and protection of his rule; a good example of this was his denial and cover-up of the Ukrainian genocide-famine.

Reference Sheet #11

Overview of Stalin's Achievements

*A government **must**:*

1. *Ensure its own survival;*
2. *Ensure the survival of the nation's citizenry and protect against internal enemies;*
3. *Protect the country against external enemies and foreign invasion.*

I Collectivization

- Stalin modernized the Soviet Union in industry and agriculture; the latter was done through his collectivization program of Soviet land, with these results: (a) per person yields increased; (b) more workers available to work in other areas, namely industry; and (c) the development of the machine-tractor industry which became the nuclei of future resistance forces to invaders (the development of tanks).
- He hastened the decline of free-enterprise capitalism in the Soviet Union, and led the rise of state control in the economy, which is the backbone of the socialist ideology.
- He promoted the equality of opportunity amongst all Soviet peoples.
- Increased food production resulted during his second five-year plan (1933-38) for Soviet agriculture (Chamberlin, p. 495).
- Greater efficiency in methods of production developed (i.e., MTS - Machine Tractor Stations).

II Purges

- Stalin eradicated non-communist, radical, dangerous elements attempting to revolt against Soviet power; thus promoting the security of the state.
- He preserved changes made by communism in the Soviet Union from 1917 on.
- He allowed for bureaucratic movement within government through his removal of possible enemies of the people.

- The purges meant protection for Soviet powers.
- Stalin maintained the loyalty of the Red Army.
- Constant fear was a strong deterrent against possible counter-revolutionaries.

III GULAG

- The GULAG system kept the Soviet citizenry safe from radical, dangerous elements in the Soviet Union.
- Stalin resettled Siberia and other taiga zones to build up economic bases in the Soviet Union.
- GULAGs presented a strong deterrent against any possible criminals.
- Stalin harnessed criminal energy for constructive social purposes. His theory of justice was based upon using criminals for constructive purposes via community services, rather than subsidizing confined persons as in a number of North American cities.

IV World War II

- Stalin was a major contributor to the Allied war effort in defeating Hitler's Germany.
- Stalin restored the security of the Soviet regime and homeland by repulsing the invaders.
- All actions performed by Stalin during World War II were done for the betterment/defence of the Motherland.
- World War II allowed for the salvation, organization and protection of adjoining nations (which later became Soviet satellites).
- Stalin mobilized a huge nation into a winning war machine and developed the Soviet Union into a strong, modern, industrial nation.
- He engaged Nazi power when all other Allies were in decline by absorbing onslaught of 80% of German military forces; yet conquered Germany.
- Stalin was responsible for USSR's entry into the Nuclear Age, and subsequent status as a world power.
- Stalin's domination of government during the war years was justified since he was acting to ensure the survival of the Soviet Union.

- If Stalin, as Commander-in-Chief of the Red Army, is to be blamed for the great reverses after June 22, 1941, then he must also be credited with the great victories that followed.

V Summary

- Much blame has been levelled at Stalin for bringing the Soviet Union into World War II, but along with criticisms must come praises, since Stalin's USSR alone kept Germany occupied until the other Allied powers could attempt an escalation of their war effort; Stalin was able to force a Nazi retreat from the Soviet Union which ensured the defeat of Hitler.
- Stalin's dictatorial regime was really no different than any other in Soviet history; Stalin, Peter the Great, Ivan the Terrible were all dictators for strong reasons: due to the USSR's size and varied cultures, a strong, centralized government is needed to effectively rule this vast land; thus, Stalin's actions as leader of the Soviet Union were quite similar to those of many Russian rulers before him.

Reference Sheet #12

Crimes Against Humanity

Prosecution Case:

Stalin is charged with masterminding numerous atrocious crimes against humanity during his rule as leader of Russia.

- "A battalion watched behind every front, with its own arms, prisons and executioners. A frequent duty was to supply blocking detachments—units whose job was to drive prisoners forward over minefields, or others dressed in white to attract enemy fire, and to shoot retreating troops" (Tolstoy, p. 240).
- "In September 1941 a Secret Military Order was issued (the first of many), ordering soldiers to kill themselves rather than surrender. Those who voluntarily surrendered would be punished if recaptured; in the meantime their families would suffer retribution . . . The chief purpose was to prevent Russians defecting to the enemy, as it was presumed that anyone escaping Soviet power must necessarily wish to work against it . . . Nazi cruelty to Russian prisoners resulted in millions of deaths—a result greatly to the satisfaction of the Soviet Government" (Tolstoy, p. 240).
- "Merkulov and Beria's deputy Ivan Serov directed the eviction operations against the Chechens. In February 1944 the freedom-loving mountain tribesmen were tricked into participating in some military maneuvers, whereupon they were surrounded by NKVD troops and loaded onto trains. Their families were sent along right behind them—without belongings, without clothing, without provisions, without water. They were sent in locked and barred railroad cars to the rigorous Kazakh Steppes. At the destination the doors of the cars were opened. The corpses of the children were carried out first, then those of the adults. For those who resisted the forcible evacuation from the auls (mountain villages in the Caucasus), it was simpler: they were locked in sheds and burned. Cremated alive" (Antonov, p. 274).
- "At the start of the war there were about five thousand prisoners in the Oryol isolation prison for political offenders. Among them were Maria Spiridonova, a former leader of the Left Socialist Revolutionary Party (Left SRS), and Iosif

Khodorovsky, former secretary of the Siberian Bureau of the Communist Party, a Bolshevik since 1907. When the Germans were about to take Oryol, the prisoners were herded into the basement, which was then flooded. They all died, all five thousand. (Khodorovsky's wife, who was shipped off to a camp, told about this atrocity)" (Antonov, p. 275).

- "In the first months of the war, column after column of prisoners, starving, half-naked, were driven eastward over well-worn roads. The weak were finished off with bayonets. Those who survived the miles and miles of marching were shoved into railroad cars without water or food and shipped east" (Antonov, p. 275).
- "Perhaps the worst—certainly the most notorious—massacre took place at the city of L'vov in the Ukraine. Several thousand prisoners of various nationalities had been gathered in the three main gaols . . . When the Germans did enter L'vov, on 29 June, they encountered a hideous spectacle. The whole city stank of putrefying flesh, and the prisons were surrounded by agonized relatives of those suspected of being held within. Next day a German Field Police Group began an investigation. What they found was described in the report drawn up a week later: 'Very soon, in advancing into the cellars, we found a layer, composed of a viscous mass, into which the corpses had congealed. In the first prison, bodies were stacked four or five deep on the cellar floor. Some of the cellar doors had already been bricked up by the Russians. A large number of the bodies must have been buried in this way already sometime before war broke out, since putrefaction—as stated—had made great progress then. The number of people killed in the whole town of L'vov may be estimated at about 3,500.
- "In the second of the prisons . . . the impression gained on the first day after entering the city was: From the service wings of the prison, which were situated on the ground floor looking out on a courtyard surrounded by a wooden fence, one body after the other was carried into the yard. In this case, there was no doubt that the victims had been murdered only a few days before our capturing L'vov. The cellars in question had ceilings that were splashed with blood, and in a room which had apparently served for interrogations the floor was covered with a layer of dried blood that was 20 centimetres (about 8 inches) deep. The Bolshevik hangmen had literally waded in blood" (Tolstoy, p. 246).
- "Orders were passed from the NKVD headquarters to the GULAG Administration that all camps threatened by the German advance were to be evacuated eastward. If that proved impossible, all the inmates were to be massacred" (Tolstoy, p. 243).

- "When a Yugoslav partisan leader took an opportunity of complaining about this (Red Army soldiers raping and murdering in Yugoslavia) to Stalin himself, the jovial Leader explained that the Red Army, which after all included large numbers of criminals, had earned its pleasures. He then recounted an incident in which he extended his protection to a major who had raped a woman and murdered a fellow-officer who remonstrated with him" (Tolstoy, p. 267).

The following passages are examples of Red Army behavior whilst entering into East Prussia:

- "A Russian officer encountered a girl who had been raped by at least two hundred and fifty men in a week . . . Afterwards one could stab a woman in the breast and stomach with a blunt dagger made of plexiglass, or ram a telephone or a broken bottle into her vagina. Small children made more sporting targets than adults for revolver practice. Then it was always amusing to rape, abuse and mutilate children of either sex in front of their parents . . . they could be finished off later; they hadn't much to live for, after all . . .
A Russian girl, kidnapped by the Nazis, was cycling down a street.
She was exceptionally attractive, too attractive to miss . . . 'Hey, you bitch' shouts a merry Red Army man, unhitching his machine-gun and firing a burst in to her back. She took an hour to die, whimpering: 'what for?' . . .
Eye-witness accounts provide some ideas of what had happened, though it is hard enough to imagine. Peasants had been nailed on barn doors, tortured, or shot. Fifty French prisoners of war were massacred out of hand. A military doctor saw where a whole column of refugees had been rolled over by Russian tanks; not only the wagons and teams, but also a godly number of civilians, mostly women and children, had been squashed flat by the tanks . . .
On the edge of a street an old woman sat hunched, killed by a bullet in the back of the neck. Not faraway lay a baby only a few months old, killed by a shot at close range through the forehead . . . a number of men, with no other marks of fatal wounds, had been killed by blows with shovels or gun butts; their faces were completely smashed. At least one man was nailed to a barn door" (Tolstoy, pp. 268-269).

- "Thousands of soldiers of all ranks were demobilized and allotted fates varying from return home to compulsory labour in central Asia. Similar purges swept through all levels of Soviet life . . . Millions of former prionsers-of-war and slave-labourers working in Germany were consigned to an even harsher life in Siberian camps, whilst within GULAG itself new precautionary measures were put into effect to overawe the slaves" (Tolstoy, p. 273).

Defence Case:

Defending Stalin's use of crimes against humanity to preserve the Communist system in Russia

- ". . . 'Sure, there was terror, but Stalin was simply removing the party's bureaucratic upper crust, which had been corrupted by wealth and power.' You can hear such arguments today even among Old Bolsheviks. Molotov continues to spread this popular legend. In his highly qualified opinion, the repression of the thirties was 'historically necessary . . . Among Stalin's many sententious and bloodthirsty observations, one recorded by Henri Barbusse stands out: 'The problems of repression may be reduced to that of finding the minimum necessary from the point of view of the general forward movement.' In 1934, when he wrote his book about Stalin, Barbusse took an understanding view of this statement by the Soviet leader. The Bolsheviks, Barbusse explained, considered it necessary to 'render some people harmless' only out of 'respect for human life' . . . Now we understand what Stalin meant when he spoke of giving Russia a mild case of smallpox to avoid a severe one" (Antonov, p. 213).
- "Stalin's name will always be associated with the great changes which were wrought during Russia's Iron Age: the sweep toward industrialization and the reorganization of agriculture along the lines of what might fairly be called state landlordism. More than one striking parallel may be drawn between Stalin and the most forceful and purposeful of Russia's Tsars, Peter the Great. For both the Bolshevik who was born in a cobbler's hut and the Tsar who was born to the purple have been obsessed with one overmastering idea: that their country was backward and must be pushed ahead at all costs" (Chamberlin, pp. 184-185).
- "For a quarter of a century, Stalin ruled a vast empire in the manner of an eastern despot, made more terrible and more effective by a modern technique of persuasion and repression. Ruthlessly, he had driven his country into the front rank of the world's industrial powers. Against all expectation, he had mobilized the heroism of the Russian people, and urged them to the untold sacrifices which made possible the defeat of the German invader. The victory won, he gave no pause. His armies remained to hold in subjection the territories through which they had advanced to the west. He extracted from his exhausted countrymen their last ounce of strength to rebuild their devastated land, and to prepare for the next stage of communism's aggrandizement. However malign its purpose, the scale of Stalin's achievement was stupendous, dwarfed only by its cost in human suffering."—from the private memoirs of Anthony Eden — (Rigby, p. 108)

- "It was neither Stalin's fault nor his merit that he never succeeded in sticking to the middle of the road; and that he was constantly compelled to abandon 'safety' for the most dangerous of ventures. Revolutions are as a rule intolerant of golden means and common sense. Those who in a revolution try to tread the middle of the road usually find the earth cleaving under their feet. Stalin was repeatedly compelled to make sudden and inordinately violent jumps now to this now to that extreme of the road. We shall see him over and over again either far to the right of his right-wing critics or far to the left of his left-wing critics. His periodical sharp turns are the conclusive attempts of the man of the golden mean to keep his balance amid the cataclysms of his time. What is astounding is how well he has kept his balance—each of his many jumps would have broken the neck of any less resilient leader" (Deutscher, p. 296).

Reference Sheet #13

Mass Murder

Prosecution Case:

During his rule as leader of Russia, Stalin gave the orders for senseless mass murdering of Russian and non-Russian people; research has determined that Stalin was responsible for 33 million deaths in Russia alone

- Stalin is reported to have been responsible for millions of deaths during the Ukrainian famine, Robert Conquest estimates 10 million (Conquest, p. 23), while Anton Antonov states approximately 22 million (Antonov, p. 213).
- "It was the only artificially produced famine in history . . . In 1932 the areas hit by famine did not receive a single kilogram of grain from the government. Stalin did not have on his conscience a single child saved from death by starvation. Not one . . . here is a typical example of a rural scene form the 1930s. A railroad station. Next to the tracks, wheat from the new harvest is piled in a high column. There are no railway cars and no granary. The grain is rotting under the open skies. And no one dares take any; on top of the cone stands a Red Army man with a rifle" (Antonov, pp. 64-67).
- "Stalin policies caused a Soviet holocaust, from his forcible collectivization of the peasantry from 1929-33, to the relentless system of mass terror by NKVD or MGB that continued until his death. Millions of innocent men, women, and children were arbitrarily arrested, tortured, executed, brutally deported, or imprisoned in the prisons and forced labour camps of the GULAG Archipelago. No one has yet managed to calculate the exact number of deaths under Stalin. Among those who have tried, 20 million is a conservative estimate" (Cohen, p. 23).
- "As for the Party, the first balance sheet of the purges was presented by Malenkov at the XVIIth Congress which was held in 1939. According to Malenkov, out of the 1,589,000 party members in 1939, only .3% disappeared during the purges; the same fate was reserved for 75% of the members recruited between 1921—28 and for 50% of those who joined the party from 1929-30 . . . This was also true of the leaders, since 70% of the Central Committee elected in 1934 had been physically eliminated" (d'Encausse, p. 44-45).

- "Famines when caused by natural factors such as drought and crop failure are terrifying phenomena. But what endowed the one in 1932-33 with special horror was that it was both caused and compounded by the policies of the Soviet government, or more specifically, those of Stalin, by that time the absolute dictator and the main author and enforcer of the scheme that caused the deaths of millions of his countrymen, as well as untold sufferings to the entire world population of the USSR" (Dolot, p. VII).
- "The heinous feature of the 1932-33 famine in the Ukraine was the fact that it was politically expedient, and that it had the full blessing of the top leadership of the party and of the government of the USSR. That this cold blooded massacre was deliberately engineered can be seen from the fact that every measure taken by the government of the USSR during this period was intended to increase, rather than to alleviate, the difficulties of the population" (Dmytryshyn, p. 201).
- "As the Germans drove the Red Army headlong before them and near the gates of Moscow and Leningrad, Stalin began wholesale purging and killings of officers up to the rank of General" (Tolstoy, p. 238).

Defence Case:

Defending Stalin's decision to use mass murder to ensure the internal loyalty and reliability of the Russian Bolshevik Party and the Russian nation/populace

- "The purpose [of the offensive] is . . . to remold the peasantry, its mentality and its production, along collectivist lines, and thus to bring about the abolishing of classes . . . We are gradually pressing upon and squeezing out the capitalist elements in the countryside, sometimes driving them to ruin . . . But it follows from all this that the more we advance, the greater will be the resistance of the capitalist elements and the sharper the class struggle, while the Soviet Government, whose strength will steadily increase, will pursue a policy of isolating these elements, a policy of demoralising the enemies of the working class, a policy, lastly, of crushing the resistance of the exploiters" (Hryshko, p. 67).
- "Bolshevism, with its single-party system, rests on three pillars—the Communist Party (organization and propaganda), the political police (terror and repression) and the army. If one of these should give way, the whole regime would undoubtedly collapse. The Communist Party is the brains of the Soviet system, Chekism is its soul and Army is its body. This explains why the general purge of 1937-38 was carried out on the same scale and with equal thoroughness in the Party, the NKVD and the Army" (Uralov, p. 62).

- "On April 28, a resolution of the Central Committee and of the Central Control Commission proclaimed the need to purge the party of 'undesirable' elements and established six types of undesirables: 'the enemies of the people who sow discord in the Party'; 'hypocrites who conceal from the Party their desire to sabotage its policy'; 'those who violate Party discipline, that is who label as a fantasy the objectives assigned by the Party to the development of the USSR'; degenerates of bourgeois origin'; the ambitious and the careerists who have cut themselves off from the masses'; 'moral degenerates' (d'Encausse, p. 28).

- "The Smolensk archives give examples of this misunderstanding. During the terror, people who felt threatened by the police, who had suffered, sometimes addressed moving pleas to Stalin asking for his protection against the violence and the injustice; he was then the supreme arbiter but also the protecting father from whom help was expected" (d'Encausse, p. 52).

- Stalin discussing collectivization in December 1929: "it is necessary . . . to implant in the village large socialist farms, collective and state farms, as bases of socialism, which, with the socialist city in the vanguard, can drag along the masses of peasants . . . The Socialist city can drag along the small peasant village in no other way than by implanting in the village collective and state farms and by reshaping the village on new socialist lines" (Medvedev, p. 87).

- "That is the logic of the revolution, he answered. Many of the people Stalin destroyed had stopped being revolutionaries by the mid-thirties. They had degenerated into officeholders and bureaucrats. They were pushing the party and state machine not toward socialism but toward state capitalism. Stalin had to get rid of those who were interfering with the further development of the socialist revolution; he had to push up young officials who were capable of leading the revolution forward" (Medvedev, p. 313).

- "The Socialist Revolution sets itself great and human goals; the elimination of all exploitation, the end of wars and violence, and the harmonious, all-round development of the human personality. But to reach these goals the proletariat must go through a long struggle, both with its enemies and with the vestiges of its own past. Thus revolutionaries become involved in the problem of choosing ways of fighting, in the relationship between ends and means" (Medvedev, p. 394).

- ". . . the purge has been until now an inherently permanent process of Soviet totalitarianism, and . . . its effects have not been completely negative" (Brzezinski, p. 9).

- ". . . before and after the seizure of power, the totalitarian movement must strive to keep itself pure of dangerous elements/contamination. It must fight hostile penetration. It must resolve inner power struggles and provide for the inflow of new members. In brief, it must find a substitute for the restraints of the constitutional system it has destroyed" (Brzezinski, p. 8).

Reference Sheet #14

Historical Disinformation

Prosecution Case:

Constantly during his tenure as leader of the Soviet Union, Stalin lied about historical facts and statistics denying the truth to his own people and the world.

- "When Stalin was informed of the German losses he ordered the announced casualties of his army reduced by seven million. His subjects had no need to know the truth. They were overburdened with information already. Evidently, similar humane considerations guided the Gensek (Stalin) in reducing the number of officially announced casualties in the war with Finland by a factor of ten—to 249,000" (Antonov, pp. 278-79).
- "Walter Duranty of the New York Times was the acknowledged dean of Western reporters in Moscow. He categorically denied the existence of any famine, prompting Stalin to compliment him—'You have done a good job in your reporting of the USSR'—and to reward his efforts with the Order of Lenin" (Paluch, p. 34).
- "Another factor which points vividly to the deliberate administering of the famine was the government's prevention of all attempts and efforts on the part of Ukrainian as well as non-Ukrainian organizations and agencies abroad to aid the famine-stricken population, and its labelling of all references to the famine as 'lies circulated by counter-revolutionary organizations abroad. At the same time, however, the Government of the USSR barred all foreign newspaper correspondents stationed in Moscow from entering the famine-stricken Ukraine and Northern Caucasus until the harvest of 1933 was brought in. This was designed to prevent the spread of news to the outside world of this great human tragedy'" (Dmytryshyn, p. 202).
- "But the 1937 census results were shattering. There were only about 156 million citizens in our great socialist state after all. The increase had been only 7.2 million. A deficit of 30.4 million. How many of these deaths could be attributed to the prisons and camps and how many to the famine? It's difficult, in fact impossible to tell. Should the census results be announced? Wouldn't it be better to denounce them as the product of sabotage and 'wrecking'? That's

exactly what Stalin did . . . Therefore the government was declaring the census results unsatisfactory. The data were immediately confiscated and destroyed, but the figures were still being carried around the world in the heads of statistical chiefs" (Antonov, p. 208).

- "Stalin could now be content. He had removed everyone he had to, and no one would find out about the 1937 census. But at night there was joy with Stalin . . . Thus Stalin placed statistics under lock and key" (Antonov, p. 209).
- "Certainly the collectivization coincides with the time when the party's public media parted immediately from reality, and began to portray a beautiful imaginary world in which, as Stalin put it a few years later 'life has become better and more cheerful'" (Hosking, p. 168).

Defence Case:

- In general, Stalin "doctored" the death statistics in Russia for the purpose of not demoralizing an already demoralized population.
- Stalin felt "His subjects had no need to know the truth. They were overburdened with information already" (Antonov, p. 279).

Reference Sheet #15

National Sabotage

Prosecution Case:

Stalin willfully destroyed national defences prior to World War II which had a detrimental effect on the defences of Russia.

- "In 1939, a long and deep line of will-armed fortifications (called the URy, or fortified regions) was built along our western borders. After the incorporation of the Baltic republics, western Byelorussia, western Ukraine, Bessarabia, and northern Bukovina, the Soviet border was moved 100 to 600 kilometres west. A decision was made to fortify their new frontier. Without even waiting for construction to begin on the new URy, and over the protest of B. Shaposhnikov, chief of the general staff, all of the old fortifications were dismantled by order of Stalin. This made it possible for the fascist aggressors to move through our territory unimpeded. This seems to us to be criminal negligence, bordering on treason. As for the annihilation of 80% of the highest-ranking military leaders and commanding officers, which decapitated the Red Army, that was outright treason (Article 64, the death penalty)" (Cohen, p. 60).

- "The fortifications along the old border, which had been constructed in the 1930s, were not merely dismantled; they were completely destroyed. The weapons installations were partly given over to the collective and state fairs for vegetable storehouses, and the rest were blown up. They had begun to construct another line of fortifications along the new border but, evidently fearing the displeasure of Hitler, they worked at such a leisurely pace that nothing was ready by 22 June 1941. Thus, in the probable path of an enemy offensive on our territory, we had not a single line fortified in advance, although great national resources had been spent on their construction" (Grigorenko, p. 36).

- "The fortification of the new western borders was begun. Taken all together this was truly impressive preparation, but it was scheduled for completion no earlier than 1942. And overwhelming evidence in the spring of 1941 showed that war could not be postponed that long. The time sought by the nonaggression pact was clearly coming to an end; Stalin's calculation that war could be postponed until 1942 or later was obviously unreal" (Medvedev, p. 446-447).

- "Then the shifting of the frontiers hundreds of miles to the west led to a situation where the old border defences had been largely dismantled before the new ones were properly equipped. There had been ample time to construct a new defence line, but Stalin's indecision, coupled with the reluctance of officials to take responsibility within the socialist bureaucracy, and the wasteful and clumsy exploitation of slave labour on construction work, all combined to leave defences in a state of grotesque disarray" (Tolstoy, p. 223).

Defence Case:

Defending his actions before the war of destroying old border defences and creating new defences.

- Stalin's actions in the pre-war period were designed to solidify Germany as an ally and not provoke Hitler into open confrontation.
- Stalin's decisions thus followed this principle: pacify Hitler and do not provoke conflict between Russia and Germany at *all* costs.
- ". . . They (Stalin's Russia) had begun to construct another line of fortifications along the new border but, evidently fearing the displeasure of Hitler, they worked at such a leisurely pace that nothing was ready by 22 June 1941" (Grigorenko, p. 262).
- "However, the biggest surprise from the Soviet side was yet to come. World War II was in full swing. Hitler had already approved Plan Barbarossa, the design for the attack on Russia. But Stalin ruled out any active preparations for resisting Hitler's inevitable aggression . . . Stalin did everything possible to earn this rapturous praise from his Axis partners" (Antonov, p. 262).

The Stalin "Maginot Line" is more or less congruent with the USSR's western boundary of 1939.

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Reference Sheet #16

Incompetence

Prosecution Case:

Stalin's actions during World War II showed extreme incompetence in his military and domestic leadership of Russia.

- "In 1956, Khrushchev, analysing the problem, found another explanation as simple as Stalin's; this was that Stalin's authoritarianism and lack of foresight had alone been responsible for the defeats. This comes very near to the truth, at least to one of its essential aspects. The leaders who had survived the purges were haunted by the fear of disagreeing with Stalin, and in doing, of endangering themselves. In order to preserve their own security, they had abandoned all power into Stalin's hands: his authority was unquestioned. This had an adverse effect upon the preparations for war on which Stalin had been able to impose his own military ideas, which were extremely old-fashioned" (d'Encausse, p. 82).
- Stalin admitted on May 24, 1945, "our government made not a few errors we experienced at moments a desperate situation in 1941-42, when our army was retreating, because there was no other way out" (Urban, p. 26).
- The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in its resolution of June 30, 1956, " 'On overcoming the Cult of the Personality and its Consequences', pointed out that a serious mistake was made by Stalin 'in the organization of the country's preparation for the repulse of the fascist invaders' " (Petrov, p. 227).
- "A terrible war had begun, the most destructive war in the history of the planet. So what did the Master (Stalin) do? At the end of the defence effort he placed four men devoid of the slightest gleam of intelligence. Thickheaded Molotov represented the government on the State Committee of Defence. Voroshilov, the former locksmith from Lugansk, who had long since traded his worker's smock for the uniform of a court lackey, personified the armed forces. Behind Malenkov, the official scribe and palace intriguer, stood the Secretariat of the Central Committee. Secret Police Chief Beria rounded out the foursome. This man had mastered the murderer's trade without needing to study.

He represented the organs of criminal detections and punishment . . . Absolute incompetence and weak-willed leadership at the start of the war: history will enter this crime too against Stalin's personal account" (Antonov, p. 266-267).

- "The very first weeks of the war showed how harmful one-man rule was, what disasters extreme concentration of power could lead to. Ironically, that fatal feature of Stalin's system permitted it to remain standing when scarcely any other government could have. The amazing dialectics of history. Meanwhile, thanks to Russia's expanses, the surviving armies had somewhere to retreat" (Antonov, p. 268).

Defence Case:

Defending Stalin against charges of incompetence prior to and during the war in both military and domestic affairs.

- "The Soviet Union destroyed the mighty German invader, contributing more than any other nation to the defeat of fascism; it also acquired an empire in Eastern Europe and became a superpower in world affairs. All this still inspires tributes to the majesty of Stalin's rule. It is the reason that even a humane and persecuted dissident can say, 'The Stalinist period has its legitimate place in history and I don't reject it'" (pp. 461-462).
- "Despite all his miscalculations, Stalin was not unprepared to meet the emergency. He has solidly armed his country and reorganized its military forces. His practical mind had not been wedded to any one-sided strategic dogma . . . He had achieved absolute unity of command, the dream of the modern strategist" (Deutscher, pp. 461-462).
- Stalin's national "accomplishments cannot be lightly dismissed. During the first decade of Stalin's leadership, memorialized officially as the period of the first and second five-year plans for collectivization and industrialization, a mostly backward, agrarian, illiterate society was transformed into a predominantly industrial, urban, and literate one. For millions of people, the 1930s were a time of willingly heroic sacrifice, educational opportunity, and upward mobility" (Cohen, p. 23).

Reference Sheet #17

Desertion

Prosecution Case:

When Hitler began his attack on Russia, Stalin went into hiding deserting his duties as leader of Russia.

- "The thought of an invasion struck fear in Stalin's heart. And when it came, he shut himself up in his Kremlin Apartment. The Politburo delegated Molotov to summon him, but Molotov returned empty-handed. Then all the lesser leaders arrived at the Great Leader's place. The Master, pale and dismayed, finally opened the door and backed away. He thought the Politburo members had come to arrest him. The nest day Stalin left Moscow and went into hiding at his suburban dacha" (Antonov, p. 266).
- "It wasn't until two weeks after the war began that Stalin started to get hold of himself" (Antonov, p. 266).
  - according to Khrushchev, "he [Stalin] collapsed into panic-stricken immobility, 'blurting out that all which Lenin created we have lost forever,' and waiting prostrated with fear until members of the Politburo came to demand that he take action to organize resistance."
  - at this time he was "paralyzed by his fear of Hitler, like a rabbit in front of a boa constrictor" (Tolstoy, p. 224).
  - Ivan Maisky (Soviet Ambassador to the UK) remembered how Stalin, "from the moment Germany attacked, . . . locked himself up in his apartment, he refused to see anyone and would not take part in any government decisions" (Antonov, p. 243).
  - Khrushchev was surprised by what he saw of Stalin at the beginning of the war: "in a word, Stalin trembled with fear" (Brumberg, p. 11).
- "Khrushchev told the XXth Party Congress how Stalin, on hearing of the Red Army's defeats, believed that the end had come, that everything created by Lenin had been irretrievably lost. Thereupon Stalin withdrew from direction of the war effort, until some Politburo members came to him and said that immediate measures had to be taken to correct the situation at the front" (Medvedev, p. 457).

- "As is known from the secret letter of the Central Committee to the XXth Party Congress, and from the recently published novel (Blokada) by Aleksandr Chakovsky, Stalin went into hiding on the first day of the war; for several days none of the leaders of the state could find the commander in chief. This incident would come under Article 247 (desertion) which in wartime is punishable by death" (Cohen, pp. 59-60).

Defence Case:

Stalin was prepared for WWII, and simply shunned the pubic light after the initial defeats of the Red Army.

- "On 22 June 1941 Molotov broke to the Russian people the grim news about the German attack. Stalin, as if embarrassed by the disastrous collapse of his hopes, shunned the limelight. He did not utter a single word in public for nearly a fortnight. He apparently waited to see what were the results of the first battles, and what was the feeling in the country. Closeted with his military leaders, he discussed measures of mobilization and strategic plans . . . Stalin himself presided over the Committee.

  Despite all his miscalculations, Stalin was not unprepared to meet the emergency. He had solidly armed his country and reorganized its military forces. His practical mind had not been wedded to any one-sided strategic dogma . . . He had achieved absolute unity of command, the dream of the modern strategist" (Deutscher, pp. 461-462).

Reference Sheet #18

Negligence

Prosecution Case:

Stalin did not adequately prepare Russia for Germany's invasion during World War II and Stalin showed negligence during, and prior to, World War II.

- "Due to reorganization undertaken immediately before the war our tank forces were either completely unfit for combat or poorly prepared when hostilities broke out" (Grigorenko, p. 35-36).
  - few and poorly developed airfields, most anti-aircraft equipment was ineffectual and meagre, and anti-tank forces were severely weakened as production was decreased, owing to the whim of Stalin (ibid.).
- "Troops continued to train as if it were peacetime . . . In view of impending threats of war, these flagrant blunders were tantamount to a crime" (Grigorenko, p. 36).
- "Inept orders of supreme command reversed all measures taken at the front (the command and staff of southwest front understood the great danger that threatened their forces and tried to counteract it)" . . . the southwest front was completely annihilated in little over a month (Grigorenko, pp. 20-21).
- The Finnish attack cost 200,000 Russian lives (Khrushchev put the figure at 1,000,000 lives) and the "ultimate responsibility for the worst military blunders rested on Stalin, as Soviet sources have accepted since" (Tolstoy, p. 149).
- "Stalin possessed more than enough information to form [illegible]ssment of the situation [the German attack in June 1941] but dec[illegible] on it" (Tolstoy p. 216).
- At the time of the German invasion in June 1941, "war [illegible]derway along the entire border, but Stalin did not want to believe it, he still thought some master provocation was going on . . . only after Molotov had met Schulenburg, and returned to say that Germany had declared war did Stalin realize that it was really war. Still he told Timoshenko to order the troops to repulse the enemy attack abut not to cross the border" (Medvedev, p. 457).

- Petrov (pp. 129-130) has the following to say on the destruction of the Russian defence line in the Ukraine by Stalin in the 1930s:

  > A serious mistake, which led to grave consequences at the beginning of the war, was made as a result of the decision to dismantle fortifications along the old (1939) border in connection with the construction of new defence positions. The disarmament of the old border was completed rapidly, while the building of new positions was delayed. It is sufficient to point out that the construction plans, approved in the summer of 1940, were calculated for several years. In his memoirs, Army General I.I. Fedyuninsky, who commanded the fifteenth Infantry Corps of the Kiev special military district, beginning in April 1941, relates that the construction of fortifications was far from complete. The former commander of engineer troops of the Leningrad Front, Lieutenant General B. Bychevskiy, writes that the construction of fortifications in the Leningrad military district area was still going on as of June 21, 1941, and was not complete. Bychevskiy also cites the statement of the chief of the engineer directorate of the Baltic Military District, Major General V.F. Zotov, that the sapper units of that district, just as in our own, were engaged in constructing pill-boxes, and there were no ready fortifications.
  >
  > The centres of defence with completed fortifications in many cases lacked the prescribed armaments. Garrisons needed to be brought up to strength. The chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army, Army Commissar A.N. Zaporozhets, reported to the People's Commissar of Defence, Marshal S.K. Timoshenko, on April 15, 1941: The fortified regions of our western borders are, for the most part, not combat ready.
  >
  > If the old border had not been dismantled/disarmed, the Red Army in its retreat could have, even without the completion of the new defence centres, made a stand at the old fortifications and gained precious time for regrouping units and delivering a counterblow.

- "The fortifications along the old border, which had been constructed in the 1930s, were not merely dismantled; they were completely destroyed. The weapons installations were partly given over to the collective and state farms for vegetable storehouses, and the rest were blown up. They had begun to construct another line of fortifications along the new border but, evidently fearing the displeasure of Hitler, they worked at such a leisurely pace that nothing was ready by 22 June 1941. Thus, in the probable path of an enemy offensive on our territory, we had not a single line fortified in advance, although great national resources had been spend on their construction" (Grigorenko, p. 36).

- See map of pre-1939 Soviet-Polish border.

Defence Case:

Joseph Stalin was not negligent, but did act based on indicators that Germany would not attack Russia.

- Indicators that Germany would not attack Russia:
  - NAZI-Soviet Non-aggression Pact of 1939;
  - NAZI-Soviet Trade Agreement of 1939 (Tolstoy, p. 95);
  - cooperation over division of Poland in 1939 with the NAZIs;
  - Russians let Germans train on Soviet soil during 1930s (Tolstoy, p. 81);
  - NAZI-Soviet Frontier and Friendship Treaty September 23, 1939, as Russia and Germany became bordering neighbours (Antonov, p. 259).
- "Stalin hoped—no, he was certain—that Hitler would attack his Western neighbours. A war might weaken Britain and France and Germany at the same time" (Antonov, p. 259).
- After signing the *Friendship and Frontier Treaty*, Stalin told Ribbentrop (German Ambassador to Russia) "that the Soviet government took the new pact most seriously; he could personally guarantee on his word of honour, that the Soviet Union would not betray its partner" (Antonov, p. 261).
- "Stalin outdid himself with his attentions and sign of encouragement to the aggressor. Stalin gave Hitler manganese. Hitler gave him a made-to-order, four-coloured Mercedes Benz. A most heartwarming relationship developed between the Fuehrer and the Father of the Peoples (Stalin) . . . on the day of the German army's invasion of Norway. He placed Soviet Arctic naval bases at the disposal of German warships for refuelling" (Antonov, p. 262).
- "Despite all his miscalculations, Stalin was not unprepared to meet the emergency. He had solidly armed his country and reorganized its military forces. His practical mind had not been wedded to any one-sided strategic dogma. He had not lulled the Red Army into a false sense of security behind any Russian variety of the Maginot Line, that static defence system that had been the undoing of the French army in 1940. He could rely on Russia's vast spaces and severe climate. No body of men could now dispute his leadership. He had achieved absolute unity of command, the dream of the modern strategist" (Deutscher, pp. 461-462).

Reference Sheet #19

The Nature of Evidence in Canadian Law

Evidence in criminal proceedings is regulated and governed by the *Canada Evidence Act*. This is constitutionally enforced by the *British North America Act 1867*, Section 91(27) which gives the Parliament in Ottawa power over "the procedure in criminal matters" (Peter Hogg, *Constitutional Law of Canada*, 3rd edition. Toronto: Carswell, 1992, 504).

In general, there are three points to remember when introducing evidence into a criminal trial. First, any matter involving the government may include a **defence** argument involving the *Charter of Rights and Freedoms*. Second, no evidence that is not supported by either sworn testimony or a legally acceptable sworn statement shall be admitted as evidence. This means that second-hand or "hearsay" evidence is not allowed. One could not say "the whole village just disappeared; it must have been Stalin's order." One could say that "I watched from the woods as government soldiers and NKVD men herded the villagers onto trucks. I never saw anyone again so I assumed they were killed." This brings us to the third point, that of the type of language, or specifically, words that can be used by the prosecution or defence. What is called "leading language" is not allowed. This refers to words that have negative implications, such as "evil," "perverted," or "degenerate." It is up to the judge and/or jury to decide if this is so.

As noted, the defence may claim a "Charter argument" to support its case. For example, Stalin's defence counsel may claim that the state had to infringe on people's rights to security and assembly in order to maintain their mobility, especially their economic mobility. In Canada, the Supreme Court has a long history of defining events by what they have called "community standards" (re: Morgentalar v. Queen, 1988). The defence could claim that it was acceptable in both Imperial and Soviet Russia to sacrifice the security of some for the mobility of all. The "excess" of 1929 onward could be viewed as necessary to maintain the economic mobility of the "community" as a whole. (See *Constitution Act, 1982*, Sections 7-15—this is what is referred to as "The Charter".)

Reference Sheet #20

An Overview of Critical Thinking Errors That Shape Our World

Critical Thinking Concept/Issue	*Synonym/ Meaning(s)*	*Examples for Discussion*	*Comments*
CLASSICAL FALLACIES OF DISTORTION			
Ignoratio Elenchi	- missing the point - straw man - barking up the wrong tree - red herring - *tu quoque* (you too)	The issue of whether or not the Russians had any business to have a military presence in Afghanistan was not addressed by pointing to American military involvement in Central America.	It is common practice of partisan politicians in Western-style democracies to respond to criticisms of their policies by counter-charges, rather than dealing with the criticisms factually.
Argumentum ad			
a) *hominem*	- disqualifying one's right to argue by an attack on the person - label and destroy (semanticide)	Opponents of agricultural collectivization in the USSR in the 1930s were dubbed "class enemies"	Have students collect examples of *label and destroy* tactics from - public environmental issue debates - the historical geography recent wars
b) *verecundiam*	- appeal to authority, usually based on feelings of veneration	"Biblical" authority was used to justify (sanctify) Boer land claims in South Africa	Types of authority can be: - political - moral - physical - literary (e.g., number of citations) - sapiential Which are likely to provide the most valid? . . . the least valid sources of truth?
c) *baculam*	- appeal to fear of dire consequences: - "Do this or else."	Stalin's reign of terror (a form of physical authority); "We must not press for anti-pollution measures because industries—in the face of rising costs—will move out and there will be massive unemployment." "If the referendum fails, Canada will break-up."	

Critical Thinking Concept/Issue	*Synonym/ Meaning(s)*	*Examples for Discussion*	*Comments*
d) *personam*	- appeal to personal self-interest.	"The election of certain politicians will ensure continuing grain subsidies to wheat growers"	Should society, economics and politics be structured for the "common good" or to accommodate competing selfish interests with a minimum of state interference? Is this the real basis of inter-nation rivalries and for the division of the world into armed camps? What light can economic, political and world regional geography shed on the problem?
e) *populam*	- appeal to popular prejudice/Bandwagon - "Everyone's doing it"	"If we don't sell armaments to Pomerania, someone else will"	
f) *misericordiam*	- special pleading on basis of "pity"	Certain "free-enterprise" industrial corporations want government "off their backs," but may be the first to cry for help in times of difficulty	Corporations thus requesting government aid have been dubbed "corporate welfare bums" by their opponents (an instance of *semanticide*). Is *military Keynesianism* consistent with "less government intervention" or is it "state capitalism?"
g *ignorantiam*	- ignorance of consequences is taken to be a positive proof of what is claimed to be good or true.	"There is no research to show that porno films are bad, therefore they must be OK."	A very lethal idea. What is really at stake is the "freedom to make a buck" regardless of how.
h) *distortion by negation*	denial of antecedent is used to argue for denial of consequent	If disarming two rival nations A and B is likely to yield peace it does not logically follow that not disarming A and B will lead to war. (Compare with the simpler syllogism: "Whenever it rains the field is muddy" does not imply the converse "Whenever it does not rain, the field is not muddy")	This is one of the most pernicious fallacies. If P, then Q does not mean if not P, then Q. In the case of the example given, however, a deductive fallacy may in fact be contradicted empirically.
Petitio principii	- begging the question	"Is the Aryan race superior to the Jewish race?" "Canada has two races - English and French." "Ukrainians are little Russians"	"Aryan" is a linguistic term; "Jewish" is a cultural term. Neither is a racial term. Linguistically, Jewish (Semitic/Yiddish) already belongs to the Aryan family of languages. Nevertheless contrary notions led to the genocide of a people. English and French are linguistic terms. They are of the same "race."

Critical Thinking Concept/Issue	*Synonym/ Meaning(s)*	*Examples for Discussion*	*Comments*
MORAL FALLACY			
"Ought to be" = "Is"	- Assuming that a purely imaginary ideal actually exists; so that it becomes "improper" to inveigh against "motherhood"; - "the grass is greener on the other side of the fence". - "If you're so smart why ain't you somewhere else?"	Utopia does not exist here (wherever one happens to be) because we usually have some data about the imperfections of here and now. But as an archetypal *unconscious* idea, utopia can become projected upon a *there or then* about which we have very scanty data (or data that we refuse to look at). Eg. Stalin's Russia of the 1930s was regarded with religious fervour in the West as a workers' paradise despite reports of mass purges and genocidal famine.	In terms of practical consequences this may be the most pernicious of the fallacies. Heaven help the person who challenges a spurious notion of utopia for which countless numbers of persons may lose their very lives.
SEMANTICS PRINCIPLES (bearing upon critical thinking)			
Abstraction (i)	- increasing the distance between a concept and its roots (referent) in the real world	Who has a clearer idea of wheat . . . the farmer who grows it, or the broker on the stock-exchange who buys and sells it by carloads (that he has never seen)?	To what extent was the stock-market crash of October 1987 a problem of unrealistic abstraction?
Abstraction (ii) Blind men and elephant principle	- By abstraction in this sense is meant the process of selection. Every person is selective in what he or she perceives. The selections of no two persons, from a complex entity of many attributes, are ever quite identical.	Fishermen, foresters, oil prospectors, dairy farmers, steel makers and so forth all have different perceptions as to what a nation's priorities for economic development can be. This truism can be readily experientially demonstrated, by classroom simulation games.	Each set of abstractions is related in some characterological way to the person making them. The characteristics and limitations of human perception must be taken into account as well as "logic".
Nominalist fallacy	- assuming that there is an actual *referent* for a term that has been used. * *Referent* is that which a term represents or stands for such as: a) a "thing-ma-bob", i.e., something tangible or concrete b) an *operation* by which a concept can be grounded in reality. A *semantic blank* (or blab) is the absence of a referent.	"Free trade will promote national unity." (In the absence of operational contexts this translates as "blab will blab".)	Using a semantic blank, or abstraction, having no referent or grounding in reality is a very serious problem in political discourse. *Geography* as the science of documentation, i.e., of grounding perceptions about the world to earth—plane thing-ma-bobs—provides a useful antidote.

Critical Thinking Concept/Issue	*Synonym/ Meaning(s)*	*Examples for Discussion*	*Comments*
Multi-value judgment	- mistaking an aspect of something for its essential nature or failing to realize that entities may have qualities which seem to be contradictory.	"Are the Japanese (or any other group) basically co-operative or competitive?" "Consumers are more important than producers."	Co-operation and competition are both aspects of "human nature". We are both producers and consumers.
Personification	- treating abstractions as things. - mistaking relationships for things or qualities.	"When economic justice triumphs, our national honour will be restored." It is in the "national interest".	Justice can not triumph. It is not a person. People kill one another over such semantic blanks as "national honour", "king and country" and so forth. The "interest" of the elites?
Many questions	- posing as a simple question requiring a simple answer so as to mask the sub-categories of the issue.	The question: "Is the Pomeranian famine the result of sin?", masks possible multiple factors such as drought, political corruption, guerrilla warfare, etc.	This type of distortion is most effective *when* combined with blabbery, i.e., semantic blanks.
Non-allness	- nobody knows everything about a complex situation; nor can everything about it be fully communicated.	"Our all-wise leader has been chosen by the will of God to expel foreign technology and modern industrial development from Pomerania".	
Process principle	- process can be mistaken for substance.	Sequent occupance provides a useful time-perspective for understanding the evolution of a cultural landscape.	Physicists tell us that matter is a process and that our senses give us a very distorted view of the world.
Glittering generality	- an inductive error of overgeneralizing from too few particulars.	"Los Angeles must have a wet climate because it was raining the day I was there."	Simple qualitative regional generalizations have ikonic utility in geography for young teenagers, as when one speaks of "the Hot-Wet Tropics" on the basis of data from selected climatic stations. One of the tasks of teaching is to reduce a maze of data to comprehensible form without losing sight of the original documentation.
Principle of degrees	- many things in the universe exist on a *continuum* and can not properly be described discretely.	Legends to thematic maps specify ranges of altitude, moisture, temperature and so forth. This helps to check the primitive tendency of students to speak of "high" mountains, "good" climates, "good" soils, etc.	Geography teachers tend to be very good at dealing with this problem, but need to be given more recognition by cognitive scientists for doing so.

FOOTNOTES:

1. A *non-allness approach* should be taken towards this table. It does not purport to be comprehensive. The applicational examples for the social studies classroom are purely suggestive. Teacher-practitioners can readily devise suitable applications appropriate to their unique configurations of time, place, circumstance and pupil stage.

2. The table given stresses some common fallacies of distortion—often *wilful*. The listing in section A is classical in the most literal sense as it is largely based on Aristotle's *De Sophisticis Elenchis*. Contemporary educational theory and practice in North America, however, appear not yet to have caught up with the ancients.

3. Omitted from consideration are fallacies of formal deductive reasoning and fallacies of induction and observation.

4. Deduction is not unique to social studies; it is well-honed in mathematics education and amply treated in standard textbooks of logic. In the 19th century, deductive capacity was considered to be a "power of the soul" when it was thought that the newly discovered subconscious mind could only reason deductively. Capacity for deduction is related to native intelligence. The error of *jumping* to conclusions is that of thinking mechanistically (deductively) when careful induction (looking at all of the evidence) is required.

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